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Counting the Dragon's Teeth and Claws: the Definition of Hard
Paternalism
Abstract
n his classic 1897 essay, The Path of the Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. warned against blind imitation of the
past and called for "enlightened skepticism" toward the law. He described the first step of this critical
examination as getting "the dragon out of his cave and on to the plain and in the daylight" so that "you can
count his teeth and claws and see just what is his strength." Over the past thirty years, disagreements over the
appropriate definition of "paternalism" have often masked further disputes over the circumstances under
which the restriction of substantially autonomous self-regarding conduct is permissible. Holmes' dragon, hard
paternalism in this case, has remained hidden in its cave.
In this article, I pull the dragon out of its cave so that we can get a good look at him. I address the conceptual
problems surrounding paternalism by rigorously defending a definition of "hard paternalism" containing
logically individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Moreover, the benefits of a clear and
comprehensive definition are not only conceptual. Defining hard paternalism with an adequate degree of
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COUNTING THE DRAGON'S TEETH AND CLAWS:
THE DEFINITION OF HARD PATERNALISM
Thaddeus Mason Pope*
ABSTRACT
In his classic 1897 essay, The Path of the Law, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. warned against blind imitation of the past and called for
enlightened skepticism toward the law.' He described the first step of
this critical examination as pulling "the dragon out of his cave and on
to the plain and in the daylight" so that "you can count his teeth and
claws and see just what is his strength."2 Over the past 30 years,
disagreements over the appropriate definition of "paternalism" have
often masked further disputes over the circumstances under which the
restriction of substantially autonomous self-regarding conduct is
permissible. In the case of Holmes' dragon, hard paternalism has
remained hidden in its cave.
In this Article, I pull the dragon out of its cave to closely examine
it. I address the conceptual problems surrounding paternalism by
rigorously defending a definition of "hard paternalism" that contains
logical, necessary, and jointly sufficient conditions. Moreover, the
benefits of a clear and comprehensive definition are not only
conceptual. Defining hard paternalism with an adequate degree of
precision will enable more useful normative dialogue about the
conditions under which hard paternalistic restrictions are justifiable.
* Attorney, Arnold & Porter. J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; M.A. (philosophy),
Georgetown University; Ph.D. (philosophy), Georgetown University. Thanks to Professors Tom L
Beauchamp, Lawrence 0. Gostin, Anita L. Allen-Castellitto, and Madison Powers for their helpful
comments on earlier versions of this Article.
1. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457 (1897).
2. Id
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INTRODUCTION
Paternalism is the restriction of a subject's self-regarding conduct
primarily for the good of that same subject. The concept of
"paternalism" is widely employed by writers of academic legal
literature, judicial opinions, and legislative reports. 4 It is a basic
organizing principle in the law.5 Paternalism is, for example, the
operative (even if often unrecognized) rationale limiting the
assumption of risk doctrine in tort law.6  Paternalism is at the
3. See infra notes 3-7 and accompanying text. John Kultgen argued that the term "parentalism" is
preferable to "paternalism" because it does "not incorporate a negative evaluation in its very definition.
• . as to bias judgment." JOHN KULTGEN, AUTONOMY AND INTERVENTION: PARENTALISM IN THE
CARING LIFE 61 (1995); see also id. at 48; AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT 400 n.69 (1996) ("As John Locke long ago pointed out, the more appropriate term is
'parentalism'....'); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES or GovERNMENT, 2D TREATISE §§ 52-53, at 345-46
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1698). However, philosophers and commentators have generally rejected
Kultgen's proposed usage. See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 319 n.25 (4th ed. 1994); JAMES F. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE?
PATERNALISM IN HEALTH CARE 8 (1982) ("I will use 'paternalism' more frequently because it has a
sharper and clearer 'system of associated commonplaces.' It is also hallowed by numerous practical and
theoretical discussions."); JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM xiii (1984) (admitting the attractiveness of the
alternate vocabulary but choosing, nevertheless, to "bow to convention"); NINA NIKKU, INFORMATIVE
PATERNALISM: STUDIES IN THE ETHICS OF PROMOTING AND PREDICTING HEALTH 18 n.2 (1997)
(choosing the "notion paternalism" because "it has a sharper and clearer association"); DENNIS F.
THOMPSON, POLITICS ETHICS AND PUBLIC OFFICE 148 (1987); Gillian Brock, Review of Autonomy and
Intervention: Parentalism and the (Overly?) Caring Life, 6 BUS. ETHICS Q. 533, 539 (1996) [hereinafter
Brock, Parentalism] (rejecting the use of the term "parentalism" because it has "connotations which are
just as negative as the term 'paternalism'"); Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REv.
229, 229 n.I (1998) (using "paternalism" because "it is the term almost invariably used in the relevant
philosophical, economic, and legal literature").
4. See, e.g., Chevron USA, Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 85-86 (2002) (stating that the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA") was meant to outlaw "workplace paternalism" only in the form of "sham
protection" offered by employers to prevent disabled workers from working); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (rejecting paternalistic justifications for restrictions on speech); H.R.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 74 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 356 (identifying
"paternalism" as "perhaps the most pervasive form of discrimination for people with disabilities");
Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalis,n and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983); David L.
Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Patemalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519 (1988).
5. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L REV. 563, 631-36
(1982).
6. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (4th ed. 1971).
The attitude of the courts has not, in general, been one of paternalism. Where no public
interest is contravened, they have left the individual to work out his own destiny, and are
not concerned with protecting him from his own folly in permitting others to do him
harm. In the field of negligence, this policy has been given effect by the doctrine of
assumption of risk, which relieves the defendant of the obligation to exercise care.
Id § 101; see also 4 JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 214-15 (1990) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING] ("[m]he harm principle
unmediated by Volenti collapses into paternalism."); KULTOEN, supra note 3, at 166 (providing as an
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normative center of increasingly pressing public health questions
concerning the permissibility of restrictions on the consumption of
tobacco products and sugary, fatty foods.
7
Nevertheless, despite its pervasive use, the concept of paternalism
lacks a clear and crisp definition. Some writers use the term
paternalism to mean "soft paternalism." Other writers use the term
paternalism to mean "hard paternalism." However, these two forms
of paternalism must not be confused. Soft paternalism, restricting a
subject's self-regarding conduct where the conduct is not
substantially voluntary, is morally uncontroversial.8  Hard
paternalism, restricting a subject's self-regarding conduct where the
conduct is substantially voluntary, on the other hand, is very morally
controversial and presents interesting and difficult moral questions.
9
Because considerable and meaningful differences exist between
the two main types of paternalism---"hard" (also known as "strong")
paternalism and "soft" (also known as "weak") paternalism-writers
ought not to use the term paternalism by itself, without adjectival
modifiers. Rather, they should always refer to the specific type of
paternalism with which they are dealing. Otherwise, vriters might
readily endorse a policy option under the assumption that it involves
soft paternalism when it really involves hard paternalism. On the
other hand, writers might dismiss a policy option as unavailable
under the assumption that it involves hard paternalism when it really
involves soft paternalism. In other words, the failure to distinguish
hard paternalism from soft paternalism may cause writers to employ
example of indirect pure paternalism "denial of assumption of risk as a defense against actions against a
person for violation of safety statutes"); DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNAtISTiC INTERVENTiON: THE
MORAL BOUNDS ON BENEVOLENCE 172 (1986) ("The effect of consent ... is that no tort has occurred..
. ."); Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAw 107, 109 (Richard Wasserstrom ed.,
1971) [hereinafter Dworkin, Paternalism-MORALTY] (providing as an example of paternalism "[n]ot
allowing assumption of risk as a defense to an action based on the violation of a safety statute").
7. See, e.g., Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Daniel Callahan
& Bruce Jennings, Ethics and Public Health: Forging a Strong Relationship, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
169 (2002); Note, The Elephant in the Room: Evolution, Behavioralsm, and Counteradvertising in the
Coming War Against Obesity, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1161 (2003); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing
Public Health Against Individual Liberty: The Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. Prrr. L REV. 419,
472-97 (2000) [hereinafter Pope, Smoking Regulations]; Jacob Sullum, Thinning the Herd: Is Your
Weight the Government's Business?, REASONONLuN, June 13, 2003; Kate Zernike, Food Fight: Is
Obesity the Responsibility of the Body Politic?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003.
8. See inf Part II.
9. See infra Part IV.A-B.
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the wrong set of justificatory criteria and, as a result, to incorrectly
frame important questions concerning the protection of persons from
themselves.'
0
I contend that the confusion between hard paternalism and soft
paternalism results in large measure from the lack of a precise
definition of hard paternalism."I Without a clear conceptual
demarcation, the boundary between hard paternalism and soft
paternalism remains blurred. This Article attempts to bring the
boundary into focus.
In Part I, I explain that both soft paternalism and hard paternalism
are liberty-limiting principles. 12 Each concept provides a basis for
overcoming the liberal presumption against interference with liberty.
In Part II, I briefly define soft paternalism as the limitation of a
subject's liberty where the subject does not act substantially
autonomously.' 3 In other words, soft paternalism is the restriction of
self-regarding conduct to which the subject does not consent. While
soft paternalism is often difficult to implement, it is no longer of
serious theoretical interest.' 4 Both ethical rules and legal doctrines
already employ a well-developed explanation of the circumstances
under which nonconsensual conduct may be restricted.
On the other hand, an explanation of the circumstances under
which consented conduct may be restricted requires attention. Such
an explanation is outside this Article's scope, but in order to better
frame such inquiries, I carefully define hard paternalism in Part II.'15
By defending a set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions, I
define hard paternalism as, roughly, the limitation of a subject's
liberty where the subject acts substantially autonomously. In other
words, hard paternalism is the restriction of self-regarding conduct to
10. See Shapiro, supra note 4, at 522 ("Commentators have disagreed about the appropriate
definition of paternalism, and sometimes these disagreements mask further disputes over what is morally
permissible.").
11. However, some of the confusion of hard paternalism and soft paternalism is a result of deliberate
attempts by writers to mask the latter as the former. See Thaddeus M. Pope, Is Paternalism Really Never
.. tified? A Response to Joel Feinberg, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L REV. (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter
Pope, A Response].
12. See fa Part L
13. See nfro Part II.
14. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CI. L REv. 751, 752 (2003).
15. See Infra Part IMi.
[Vol. 20:659
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which the subject consents. In Part IV, I present and respond to
objections and counterexamples to my definition of hard
paternalism. 16 Finally, I conclude that my definition will introduce
needed clarity and precision into important and ongoing dialogues
concerning the conditions under which an agent may justifiably
restrict an individual's substantially autonomous self-regarding
conduct. 17
I. LIBERTY-LIMITING PRINCIPLES
As a matter of social, political, and moral fact, our culture places a
high value on autonomy.' 8 This has become a generally recognized
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See mfra Part V.
18. In the United States, a strong liberal "individual rights" attitude exists which indicates that "as
long as individuals understand the hazards involved, they should be free to engage in [any] risky activity
that provides them with personal satisfaction." SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLrICS, AND CULTURE 7
(Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993). Modern Western society places a high value on
individual rights, autonomous decision making, and the protection of the private sphere from
government intrusion. See generally Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No
right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others ... ."); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960) ("Anglo-American law starts with
the premise of thorough-going self-determination."); Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,
93 (N.Y. 1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body.... ."), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. "hunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y.
1957); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A REPORT ON THE
ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER
RELATIONSHIP 44-51 (1982) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT]; Isaiah Berlin, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 137 (1969); 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 9 (1984) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS]
("[Miost writers on our subject have endorsed a kind of 'presumption in favor of liberty'...."); 3 JOEL
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LiMITs OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF 9, 14, 207, 211-12 (1986)
[hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF]; MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 22-36 (1962);
WILLARD GAYLEN & BRUCE JENNINGS, THE PERVERSION OF AUTONOMY: THE PROPER USES OF
COERCION AND CONSTRAINTS IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY 58 (1996) ("Autonomy has ceased to be one value
among many and has assumed pride of place as the moral touchstone of our personal lives and our social
institutions."); id at 54 ("[Autonomy) has been elevated to first place among the things we value and
want to protect"); UDO SCHOKLENK, ACCESS TO EXPERIMENTAL DRUGS IN TERMINAL ILLNESS:
ETHICAL ISSUES 9-10 (1998); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875,
875-76 (1994); Perri 6, The Morality of Managing Risk: Paternalism Prevention and Precaution, and
the Limits of Proceduralism, 3 J. RISK RES. 135, 155 (2000); Kevin P. Quinn, Viewing Health Care as a
Common Good: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 286, 302 (2000) (calling
"liberal individualism" "America's predominant weltanschauung," "the de facto public philosophy in
America," and "[o]ur cultural gestalt"); Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on Smoking Regulation, 43
STAN. L. Rv. 475, 479 (1991) ("Once information about risk has been adequately conveyed, the
standard liberal position holds that individual choice should be respected rather than limited."); id at
482 ("[lur political culture has resisted telling individuals what is good for them ...."); Albert Weale,
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feature of the Western-American classical liberal tradition,
particularly as society has reinvigorated that tradition since the
consumer revolution of the 1960s. 19 Given the fact that "self-
determination is highly valued in the cultural climate of western
societies," any interference with individual liberty is presumptively
invalid and demands justification.20 As John Stuart Mill explained,
"[T]he onus of making out a case always lies on the defenders of
legal prohibitions." 21 Joel Feinberg similarly explained, "[T]he
burden of proof is on the shoulders of whoever advocates legal
coercion. ',22 In short, the proponent of liberty-limiting state action
always bears the burden of proving its moral justifiability.
23
The presumption of noninterference with individual liberty, while
strong, is rebuttable. 24 It is, after all, only a presumption. As Tom
Paternalism and Social Policy, 7 J. Soc. POL'Y 157, 169 (1978) [hereinafter Weale, Paternalism]
('[The chief objection to paternalistic intervention is that it interferes with the autonomy of the
individual... ."); Gary B. Weiss, Paternalism Modernised, II J. MED. ETHIcs 184, 185 (1985) ("Civil
rights, woman's [sic] equality movements, and consumerism have all emphasised the desire of people to
be treated as self-determining agents."); Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The
Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REv. 15, 36-37 & nn.66-69 (1991); Peter L.
Berger, Furtive Smokers-and What They Tell Us About America, COMMENTARY, June 1994, at 21, 26
([A] strong tradition of individual autonomy has existed in America, expressed in folklore and
literature, in everyday patterns of interaction ('it's a free counbyl'), and of course in political institutions
and law.").
19. See NIKKU, supra note 3, at 114; Dan W. Brock, A Case for Limited Paternalism, 4 CRIM. JUST.
ETimcs 79, 84 (1985) [hereinafter Brock, Limited Paternalism]; Richard Bronaugh, Review of JoHN
KLEIoG, PATERNSM, 25 DILOGuE-CAN. PHIL. REv. 800, 803 (1986); Bill New, Paternalism and
Public Policy, 15 J. ECoN. & PHiL. 63, 82 (1999).
20. See NcKiu, supra note 3, at 344.
21. 3 JOHN START MILL, PRINCEPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, WITH SOME OF THEIR
APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 938 (J.M. Robson ed., 1965) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY]; Id at 950 ("Laissez-faire, in short, should be the general practice: every
departure from it, unless required by some great good, is a certain evil.").
22. FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 6, at 4; TOM L. BEAUCHAMF, PHILOSOPHICAL
ETHICS 268 (3d ed., 2001) [hereinafter BEAUCHAMP, ETHICS] ("Liberalism embodies an attitude of
distrust toward use of the coercive power of the state[.]"); VANDEVEER supra note 6, at 92-94 (arguing
that "there is a moral presumption against the legitimacy of invasive interference"); Loretta M.
Kopelman, Moral Problems in Psychiatry: The Role of Value Judgments in Psychiatric Practice, in
MEDICAL ETHics 275, 301 (Robert M. Veatch ed., 2d ed. 1997) ("[l]nterference with the liberty of
adults requires a heavy burden of proof. ..
23. See supra notes 18-22.
24. See NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS 76, 80, 91-92
(1997); FEINBERO, HARM TO OTHERs, supra note 18, at 9 ("Liberty should be the norm; coercion always
needs some special justification[:] .. the 'presumptive case for liberty."'); id at 108; FEINBERO, HARM
TO SELF, supra note 18, at 57 ("[Vjtle must reject legal paternalism, or at least hold it under grave
suspicion ('presumptively false')."); FEINBERO, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 6, at 66-67, 321;
GERALD F. GAUS, VALUE AND JUSTIFICATION: THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERAL THEORY 396 (1990);
JOHN KEKES, AGAINST LIBERAuSM 8 (1997) ("[The claims of freedom may be legitimately restricted-
the disagreements are over the question of how far and under what circumstances and for what reasons
[Vol. 20:659
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Beauchamp and James Childress explained, respect for autonomy
"has only prima facie standing and can be overridden by competing
moral considerations." 25 This makes sense. Rejecting the legitimacy
of all liberty-limiting principles-a position that one writer names
"radical consumer autonomy" 2 6-would be tantamount to a form of
Max Stimer's unworkable radical individual anarchy.2 An anarchic
its restrictions may be legitimate .... "); KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 4-5 (comparing paternalism to
"'killing,' where, although no moral judgment is embodied, there is accorded sufficient importance to
the life/death distinction to warrant our marking the circumstance" and "raises a moral question about
it"); KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 38 ("Until all exceptive clauses are spelled out, rules [like autonomy]
assert prima facie rights and may be overruled."); id at 112; id at 176 ("Since liberty is a central good,
there is a moral presumption against all liberty-limiting measures.") (footnote omitted); NDCKU, supra
note 3, at 19 ("[S]elf-determination . . . is not an absolute value but a prima facie value .... ");
VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 92-94 (arguing that "there is a moral presumption against the legitimacy
of invasive interference"); id at 306, 335-36; Sin Yee Chan, Paternalistic Wife? Paternalistic
Stranger?, 26 Soc. THEORY & PRAc. 85, 87 & n.9 (2000) ("[There is a strong presumption against
[autonomy's] violation, so that paternalism requires weighty reasons to be justified."); James F.
Childress, If You Let Them, They'd Stay in Bed All Morning, in PRACTICAL REASONING IN BIOETHICS
59, 66 (1997); Ellen L. Fox, Paternalism and Friendshp, 23 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 575, 579 (1993)
(discussing, like Kultgen, paternalism in personal relationships); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health
Law in a New Century: Part III: Public Health Regulation: A Systematic Evaluation, 283 JAMA 3118,
3118 (2000); Robert N. Harris, Jr., Comment, Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement of
Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 UCLA L. REv. 581, 581 (1967) [hereinafter Harris,
Adult Behavior]; Tziporah Kasachkoff, Paternalism and Drug Abuse, 58 MT. SINAI J. MED. 412, 412
(1991) (-[S]ince we value the right of individuals to lead their own lives, .. . any interference with
another's life . . . demands some justification."); Robert C. L. Moffat, Cloning Freedom:
Criminalization or Empowerment in Reproductive Policy?, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 583,586 (1998); Michael
Moore, Liberty and Drugs, in DRUGS AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM: MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 61,
69 (Pablo De Greiffed., 1999); Perri 6, supra note 18, at 140; Shapiro, supra note 4, at 570 (explaining
that the presumption "should operate . . . as a screen at the legislative level"); id at 544
("[A]ntipatenalism is the presumption, at least when it comes to action on behalf of the state, and that
the paternalist therefore always has the burden of persuasion."); Albert Weale, Invisible Hand or
Fatherly Hand? Problems of Paternalism in the New Perspective on Health, 7 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &
L. 784,802-03 (1983) [hereinafter Weale, Invisible Hand].
25. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 126; see also TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, PHILOSOPHICAL
ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 388 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter BEAUCHAMP,
MORAL PHILOSOPHY] ("Some valid restrictions on our liberty are entirely appropriate."); TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 5 (5th ed. 2001) ("All moral
norms can be justifiably overridden in some circumstances.") [hereinafter BIOMEDICAL ETHICS].
26. Michael H. Cohen, US. Dietary Supplement Regulation: Belief Systems and Legal Rules. 11
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 8 n.32 (2000).
27. See HETA HAYRY, THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PATERNALISM 78 (1991) [hereinafter HAYRY,
MEDICAL PATERNALISM]; Nicholas Capaldi, Liberal Value Versus Liberal Social Philosophy, 4 PHIL. &
THEOLOGY 283, 286 (1990); James F. Childress & Courtney C. Campbell, "Who Is a Doctor to Decide
Whether a Person Lives or Dies? ": Reflections on Dax's Case, in PRACTICAL REASONING IN BIOETHICS
121, 123 (1997); Douglas N. Husak, Liberal Neutrality, Autonomy, and Drug Prohibitions, 29 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 43, 54 (2000) [hereinafter Husak, Liberal Neutrality] ("Liberals must impose some limitations
on the conception of the good that persons are allowed to pursue; they are not resigned to impassivity
when persons pursue a conception of the good that includes a preference for murder or rape."); KURT
MELVIN ARMSDEN, PATERNALISM: ITS SCOPE AND LIMrrs 37-38 (unpublished dissertation 1989). Even
libertarians do not permit individuals to do anything to themselves, drawing the line where
individuals thereby undermine obligations to third parties. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 58 (1974). In contrast, anarchists would disallow not only paternalism
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political system in which the state can never intervene is as untenable
as a totalitarian one in which the state can always intervene.
28
Between the two extremes of anarchy and totalitarianism lies a wide
range of potentially legitimate liberty limitation.
Almost no one disputes the vague proposition that liberty
limitation is sometimes morally justifiable. Isaiah Berlin observed
that "a frontier must be drawn between the area of private life and
that of public authority. Where it is to be drawn is a matter of
argument, indeed of haggling." 29 However, for what reasons and
under what circumstances ought the state to restrict individual
liberty?
The answer is that the state should limit liberty only when a
justifiable reason for doing so exists.30 Philosophers refer to these
justified reasons as "liberty-limiting principles," 31  "coercion-
legitimizing principles,"32 or "autonomy-limiting principles."33 The
term liberty-limiting principle seems to have more pervasively
influenced the literature on the subject, and I will use it here. Liberty-
limiting principles need not state either necessary or sufficient
conditions for moral justifiability. 34 Rather, as Joel Feinberg stressed,
"[E]ach liberty-limiting principle puts forth a kind of reason it claims
always to be relevant-always to have some weight-in support of
but also the harm principle as a legitimizing ground for governmental intervention. See, e.g., MAX
STiRNER, THE EGO AND HIS OWN (Steven T. Byington trans., James J. Martin ed., 1963).
28. See Berlin, supra note 18, at 123-24 ("[Tihe area of men's free action must be limited by law.
But.. . there ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal freedom which must on no account be
violated. . . ."); id at 126 ("[S]ome portion of human existence must remain independent of the sphere
of social control. To invade that preserve, however small, would be despotism."); KULTGEN, supra note
3, at 132; NuuKu, supra note 3, at 114-15; JONATHAN C. SCHONSHECK, ON CRIMINALIZATION: AN
ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 49-50 (Law and Philosophy Library v.19, 1994);
Christine Pierce & Donald VanDeVeer, Grounds for Restricting Liberty, in AIDS: ETHICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 61, 71 (1988); Moore, supra note 24, at 65.
29. Berlin, supranote 18, at 124.
30. CONTEMPORARY IssuEs IN BIOETHICS 32-33 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 4th
ed. 1994) [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY ISSUES].
31. E.g., id; FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 18, at 9-10; FEINBERG, HARMLESS
WRONGDOING, supra note 6, at ix.
32. E.g., FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 18, at 9; FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note
18, at ix; FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 6, at ix.
33. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP, MORAL PHILOSPHY, supra note 25, at 389; BEAUCHAMP, ETHICS, supra
note 22, at 353.
34. See FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 18, at 187; FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note
18, at 374; FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 6, at 66.
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proposed legal coercion, even though in a given instance it might not
weigh enough to be decisive."
35
In short, liberty-limiting principles are merely "relevant reasons";
reasons that can have-but do not necessarily have---"decisive
weight" when balanced, in particular contexts, against the
presumptive case for liberty.36 Hard paternalism and soft paternalism
are two liberty-limiting principles.
II. THE DEFINITION OF SOFT PATERNALISM
A. The Core Notion of Soft Paternalism
The sort of paternalism that is justified on the basis that the subject
lacks the requisite decision-making capacity to engage in the
restricted conduct is described as either soft37 or weak 38 paternalism.
Soft paternalism legitimizes intervention with a subject's conduct
where that subject's decision to engage in the restricted conduct is
one of the following: (1) not factually informed, (2) not adequately
understood, (3) coerced, or (4) otherwise not substantially
voluntary.39 In short, soft paternalism justifies interference with a
35. FEINBERG, HARMTOOTERS, supranote 18, at 10.
36. See id; FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at ix, 25; FEINBERG, HARMLESS
WRONGDOING, supra note 6, at 321, 323; see also FRED R. BERGER, HAPPINESS, JUSTICE, AND
FREEDOM: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL 226, 249 (1984); Richard
A. Posner, On Liberty: A Reevluaation, in ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2001)
("Properly speaking, the existence of an externality is a necessary rather than sufficient condition for
government intervention, since the cost of that intervention must be considered, along with the actual
and not merely the potential benefit").
37. E.g., GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 124 (1988) [hereinafter
DWORKIN, AUTONOMY]; FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 12; Childress & Campbell, supra
note 27, at 124.
38. E.g., BEAUCHAMP, MORAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 413; BEAUCHAMP, ETHICS, supra
note 22, at 375; CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 17, 25 (employing the terms "limited" and "restricted" as
well); FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 12 n.16; SUSAN B. RUBIN, WHEN DOCTORS SAY No:
THE BATTLEGROUND OF MEDICAL FUTILITY 84 (1998) (also employing the term "limited");
VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 81-86; Tom L. Beauchamp, Paternalism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIOETHICS 1914, 1914-15 (Warren T. Reich ed., 1995) [hereinafter BEAUCHAMP, Paternalism] ("[Tihe
terms 'weak' and 'strong' seem to have more deeply influenced the bioethics literature and will be used
here."); Hera Hayry, Paternalism, i 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPLIED ETHICS 449,453-54 (Ruth Chadwick
ed., 1998) [hereinafter Hayry, Paternalism] (uniquely employing the terms 'hard' and 'soft' to draw a
second distinction to distinguish conduct that constitutes a mere prima facie interference with
autonomy).
39. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 277; JEREMY BENTHAM, THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. XIII, § 3 (1988) (1789); LOCKE, supra note 3, IST
TREATISE §§ 54-76, at 169-74; RUBIN, supra note 38, at 84 ("In limited or weak paternalism, a patient's
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subject's liberty to benefit that same subject only if-indeed,
precisely because-her choices are not substantially voluntary.
40
Moreover, soft paternalistic intervention is proper not only when
the subject's conduct is known for certain to be not substantially
voluntary but also when the subject's conduct is very probably or
strongly suspected to be not substantially voluntary. Because
voluntariness must be ascertained one way or the other, soft
paternalism legitimizes temporary intervention necessary to
determine whether a subject's conduct is, in fact, substantially
voluntary.
For example, if you were about to eat an apple that only I knew
was poisoned, then on soft paternalistic grounds, I could justifiably
interfere with your liberty and prevent you from eating that apple. My
interference would be justified because you, in fact, were unaware of
this important feature of your action. In other words, I did not stop
you from doing what you wanted to do (eat an apple). Rather, I
stopped you from doing something that you did not want to do (eat a
poisoned apple). 41 Alternatively, my interference might be justified
because I had to determine, one way or the other, whether you were
unaware of this important feature of your conduct.
preferences, decisions, and actions are overridden because there are internal or external constraints on
his ability to think and act freely."); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference With Private Preferences, 53
U. Cn. L. REv. 1129, 1161-64 (1986) [hereinafter Sunstein, Legal Interference]. Joel Feinberg provided
an extended analysis of voluntariness-vitiating or voluntariness-nullifying factors. FENBERG, HARM TO
SELF, supra note 18, at 12, 143-315. These factors are outlined in Diagram 20-5 and in paragraphs B, C,
and D. Id. at 115.
40. See supra note 39. 1 employ the term substantially voluntary as equivalent to substantially
autonomous.
41. Voluntariness will, of course, vary inversely relative to the thickness of the description of the act
See FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 71-74 (noting that voluntariness will vary depending on
what is taken as the relevant background or perspective, the "norms of expectability," the "benchmark,"
the "baseline"); id. at 128 (noting that "the term 'harm' can always mask an evaluative element"); id. at
123, 129, 132, 277, 282, 294, 304-05; VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 30; Richard Arneson, Mill Versus
Paternalism, 90 ETmics 470, 484 (1980) [hereinafter Arneson, Mill Versus] ("If one thinks of
voluntariness as relative to the description of an act, then I may be acting voluntarily in putting what I
believe to be salt on my food and involuntarily at the same moment in putting what is in fact deadly
poison on my food."); David Gordon, Comment on Hospers, 4 J. LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 267, 268 (1980)
("[Ain action can often be referred to by different descriptions ...."); Cass R. Sunstein, A Note on
"Voluntary" Versus "Involuntary" Risks, 8 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 173, 179 (1997) [hereinafter
Sunstein, A Note]; Weale, Invisible Hand, supra note 24, at 788 ("iThere is a certain indefiniteness
about the identification of actions; by redescribing the affected behavior we can make it clear that a
paternalist concern with consequences also involves a restriction upon actions.") (footnote omitted).
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The choices that individuals make do not always reflect their
desires and preferences. "People do not always mean what they say;
they do not always say what they want; and they do not always want
what they say they want. ' '42 A lack of information, maturity, or
voluntariness can thwart the realization of desires.43 For these
reasons, commentators have widely accepted soft paternalism as an
appropriate basis for intervention." Indeed, to disallow soft
paternalism would be to espouse the widely rejected principle of
absolute anti-paternalism or, what Feinberg called, "hard
antipaternalism."4
5
B. Soft Paternalism Is a True Liberty-Limiting Principle
1. Soft Paternalism Constrains Only Conduct to Which the
Subject Does Not Consent
The core idea of the soft paternalism liberty-limiting principle is
that only "real" decisions (that is, those decisions free from cognitive
and volitional defects) are worthy of respect. 46 Soft paternalism is
soft because it does not call for the constraint of any real decisions.4 7
42. Carl Elliott, Meaning What You Say, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 61,61 (1993).
43. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Disrupting Vohuntary Transactions, in MARKETS AND JUSTICE 279,
282 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., New York Univ. Press 1989); id at 290 ("Absence
of information is ... a conventional basis for the disruption of voluntary transactions."); Sunstein, Legal
Interference, supra note 39, at 1158-66.
44. See, e.g., Beauchamp, Paternalism, supra note 38, at 1915; Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 939,940 (Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., 1992) [hereinafter
Dworkin, Paternalim-ENCYCLOPEDIA]; Gostin, supra note 24, at 3119.
45. Joel Feinberg, Paternalivm, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 390, 391 (Donald M. Borchert
ed., Supp. 1996) [hereinafter Feinberg, Paternalism]. Even professed libertarians allow regulation on
soft paternalistic grounds. See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A LIBERTARIAN: A
PERSONAL INTERPRETATION 104 (1997); John Hospers, Libertarianism and Legal Paternalism, 4 J.
LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 255, 256, 265 (1980). Though, arguably, the justificatory appeal for these
theorists comes from the harm principle. See BEAuCHAMP, MORAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 389.
46. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., HANS BLOKLAND, FREEDOM AND CULTURE IN WESTERN SOCIETY 136-75, 286-89
(Michael O'Loughlin trans., 1997) (explaining that Mill would approve of restricting substantially
nonvoluntary choices because they are "just as alien to the individual as someone else's choices");
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 12 ("[S]oft paternalism would permit us to protect him
from 'nonvoluntary choices,' which, being the genuine choices of no one at all, are no less foreign to
him."); FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 6, at xviii (arguing that soft paternalism
protects subjects "from dangerous choices that are not truly his own"); DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, DRUGS
AND RIGHTS 130 (1992) ("[A]n agent's apparent choice is not truly his if it is nonvoluntary, so
interference with it would not violate his autonomy.") [hereinafter HUSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS];
NnKKu, supra note 3, at 126; Feinberg, Paternalism, supra note 45, at 391-92 ("To restrict his liberties
in such circumstances.., we will not be interfering with his real self or blocking his real will .... ");
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Rather, it calls for the constraint of only impaired decisions, decisions
that are the product of "compulsion, misinformation, excitement or
impetuousness, clouded judgment . . or immature or defective
faculties of reasoning. '48 As Feinberg explained, soft paternalism
protects the subject "from dangerous choices that are not truly his
own."49  Thereby, soft paternalism, instead of counteracting
autonomy, actually helps to protect and to promote it.50 Despite its
nomenclature, soft paternalism is arguably not truly paternalistic and
is not a true liberty-limiting principle.
5 1
Husak, Liberal Neutrality, supra note 27, at 62 ("Since nonautonomous choices lack value, the state has
no reason to allow persons to make such choices."); Henrik Kjeldgaard Jorgensen, Paternalism,
Surrogacy, and Exploitation, 10 KENNEDY INST. ETHICs J. 39, 40 (2000) ("[An individual ought only to
have her decisions respected if the decision reflects autonomous self-expression.").
The possibility ofjustifiable paternalism has made a particular type of argument plausible
to some proponents of the modem principle of respect for autonomy. The idea is to
regard some types of paternalistic intervention as instances of weak paternalism .... On
this view, certain interventions are legitimate because they are aimed at nonautonomous
"persons" who do harm to "themselves."
Id at 48; Kasachkoff, supra note 24, at 413 ("Paternalistic restrictions in these cases--sometimes called
cases of 'soft' or 'weak' patemalism--c be countenanced by a liberal society because they do not
deprive the individual of any autonomous choice that he or she is in fact capable of making."); Dennis F.
Thompson, Paternalism in Medicine, Law, and Public Policy, in ETHICs TEACHING IN HIGHER
EDUCATION 245, 245 (Daniel Callahan & Sissela Bok eds., 1980) ("If a paternalistic intervention
restricts only decisions that are already unfree... the paternalism can be consistent with the principle of
liberty.").
48. Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 3, 7 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983) [hereinafter
Feinberg, Legal Paternalism].
49. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 99; see also id at 119 ("The defining purpose of the
soft paternalist is to prevent people from suffering harm that they have not truly chosen to suffer .... ");
id at 126, 130; id. at 143 ('IT]he soft paternalist would justify interference with [the subject] when, but
only when, there is a well fbunded suspicion that the actor's choice was not really his own.").
50. E.g., KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 100; Hayry, Paternalism, supra note 38, at 454 ("The core idea of
all weak paternalism is [justified because] interventions can actually support (the subject's] autonomy
instead of suppressing it."); Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Maladaptation of Miranda to Advance
Directives: A Critique of de Implementation of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 9 HEALTH MATRIX
139, 188-90 (1999) ("There is no usurpation of autonomous decision-making because there was none to
usurp. On the other hand, soft paternalism is needed to ensure autonomous decision-making,").
51. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP, MORAL PiLOSoPHY, supra note 25, at 413; BEAUCHAMP, ETHICS, sqra
note 22, at 375-77; BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, sWupra note 3, at 277-78; Tom L. Beauchamp &
Laurence B. McCullough, Medical Paternalism, in MEDICAL ETHICs: THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF
PHYSICIANS, at 93-94, 96 (1984) ("Weak paternalism is thus not a form of paternalism that can be
distinguished in any morally relevant respect from antipatemalism."); Berlin, supra note 18, at 142 ("To
be ruled by myths... from psychological or sociological causes, is a form of heteronomy, of being
dominated by outside factors... not necessarily willed by the agent. ... Knowledge liberates .. ");
SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 203, 209 (1978); FEINBERG,
HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 12 ("It is not as clear that 'soft paternalism' is 'paternalistic' at
all, in any clear sense."); id at 14 (arguing that it is "severely misleading to think of [soft
paternalism] as any kind of paternalism"); FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 6, at xvii
("[S]oft paternalism ... is, properly speaking, no kind of paternalism at all."); HUGO GROTnUS, THE
LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (Louise E. Loomis trans., 1949) (1625) ("[S]ince infants and insane persons do
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The classic example of soft paternalism, from John Stuart Mill,
involves detaining a subject who is about to unknowingly cross a
dilapidated, dangerous bridge.5 2 Mill explained that the agent "might
seize him and turn him back without any real infringement of his
liberty, for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not
desire to fall into the river." 53 Under these circumstances-where the
subject is unaware of the condition of the bridge-it cannot fairly be
said that the subject was free or autonomous in the first place because
he did not understand what he was doing.
With soft paternalism, the agent does not bring about usurpation of
autonomy because there is none to usurp. An agent cannot take
control away from someone who does not have it in the first place.
Beauchamp and Childress explained that with soft paternalism, the
agent "protect[s] persons from harm caused to them by conditions
beyond their control. 54 Indeed, soft paternalistic regulation actually
not have liberty of judgment, it is impossible for wrong to be done them in respect to such liberty.");
HAYRY, MEDICAL PATERNALISM, supra note 27, at 29-30, 34; JOHN D. HODSON, THE ETHICS OF LEGAL
COERCION 45 (1983); KEKES, supra note 24, at 16 ("[f autonomy were impossible for some
individuals ... then the extent to which the basic values [for example., liberty] ought to be provided for
them would be diminished by an amount proportional to their diminished capacity to attain autonomy.");
JONATHAN RILEY, MILL ON LIBERTY 198 (1998) ("Mill's absolute ban on paternalism can be compatible
with what is often called 'soft' or 'weak' paternalism."); THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 149; Tom L.
Beauchamp, Medical Paternalism, Voluntariness, and Comprehension, in ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR
SOCIAL POLICY 123, 136 (John Howie ed., 1983) [hereinafter Beauchamp, Medical Paternalism]; Tom
L. Beauchamp, Paternalism and Biobehavioral Control, 60 MONIST 62, 67 (1977) [hereinafter
Beauchamp, Biobehavioral Control] (''[W]eak paternalism' is not paternalism in any interesting sense,
because it is not a liberty limiting principle independent of the 'harm to others' principle."); Beauchamp,
Paternalism, supra note 38, at 1917 ("Weak paternalism, then, seems to be a defensible but
noncontroversial position that nearly everyone accepts in some form."); Childress, supra note 24, at 64;
Childress & Campbell, supra note 27, at 123; Feinberg, Paternalism, supra note 45, at 391 ("Clarity
would be improved if philosophers would speak of paternalism only when what is meant is hard
paternalism.. . ."); Soren Holm, Autonomy, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPLIED ETHICs 267, 272 (1998)
("If the decision overridden is not fully autonomous ... the problem is not a problem of paternalism...
."); New, supra note 19, at 67-69 (making the argument in economic terms); Donald H. Regan,
Justificationsfor Paternalism, in THE LIMITS OF LAW 189,191 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1974) ("Since the person who lacks information is unfree even if we do not intervene to constrain
his choice, we are not really decreasing his freedom by intervening . . . ."); Robert F. Schopp,
Behavioral Control, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICs 221, 225-26 (Warren T. Reich ed., 1995);
Shapiro, supra note 4, at 547 (stating that some defenses of soft paternalism "justify a particular
intervention on the grounds that the preconditions for autonomy are not present").
52. Udo Scholldenk noted that Mill "leaves open whether this translates into a minor inconvenience,
such as getting wet clothes, or whether he believes this is also true in the case of a very high bridge
where the fall into the water might be lethal." SCHOuILENK, supra note 18, at 33. The consensus in the
literature on Mill is that Mill intended the latter meaning.
53. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 166 (Penguin ed., 1974) (1859) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
ON LIBERTY].
54. BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 25, at 181.
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protects autonomy by ensuring that the subject's choices reflect her
true preferences.55 Robert Goodin explained:
If it is autonomy that we are trying to protect in opposing
paternalistic legislation in general, then the same values that lead
us to oppose such legislation in general will lead us to welcome
it in those particular cases where what we are being protected
from is something that would deprive us of the capacity for
autonomous choice.
56
Goodin further illustrated the point, writing: "Where people 'wish
to stop smoking, but do not have the requisite willpower[,
intervention is] not imposing a good on someone who rejects it. [It is]
simply using coercion to enable people to carry out their own
goals."
57
2. While Soft Paternalism Does Not Usurp Autonomy, It Does
Limit Liberty
Notwithstanding soft paternalism's protective role and
notwithstanding the fact that soft paternalism does not usurp
55. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 3, 2D TREATISE § 63:
The freedom of Man and Liberty of acting according to his Will, is grounded on his
having Reason, which is able to instruct him in that Law he is to govern himself by, and
make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will. To then turn him loose
to an unconstrained Liberty, before he has Reason to guide him, is not allowing him the
privilege of his Nature, to be free; but to thrust him amongst the Brutes, and abandon him
to a state as wretched and as much beneath that of Man, as theirs.
Id.; Dworkin, Paternalism-MORALITY, supra note 6, at 124 (arguing that there is "no theoretical
problem [in] ... simply using coercion to enable people to carry out their own goals"); Robert E.
Goodin, Permissible Paternalism: In Defense of the Nanny State, 1 RESPONSIVE COMMUNrY 42, 48
(1991) (arguing that intervention in the case of addiction "helps people implement their own preferred
preference .... It overrides people's preferences, to be sure. But the preferences which it overrides are
ones which people themselves wish they did not have"); Kopelman, supra note 22, at 297 ("When
people are very ill, they are 'not themselves' and cannot protect their own interests. In short, they are not
choosing autonomously and others may have to help them.").
56. ROBERT E. GOOIN, No SMOKING: TnE ETtlcAL ISSUEs 7 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1989).
57. Id. at 28; see also Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., FDA Regulation of Tobacco Advertising and Youth
Smoking: Historica Social, and Constitutional Perspectives, 277 JAMA 410, 412 (1.997) ("The
principal objection to stricter tobacco regulation-that it represented an inappropriate form of
paternalism-began to erode. In its place, regulators could argue, based on science, that nicotine actually
diminishes the capacity of an individual to make reasoned choices about whether to continue
smoking.").
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autonomy, it is conceptually lucid usage to treat soft paternalism as
an independent liberty-limiting principle. This is true because soft
paternalism still entails some tangible interference with the subject's
freedom of liberty.58 "[A physical] infringement there is: the man
wants to step on the bridge and he is prevented from doing so."
59
Although the agent does not violate the subject's autonomy, it
remains true that the paternalistic agent restricts the subject's
liberty.
60
The characterization of soft paternalism as a liberty-limiting
principle is evident by looking at how philosophers defend the
justifiability of soft paternalism while attending to the distinct
meanings of "liberty" and "freedom." John Rawls wrote that "persons
are at liberty to do something when they are free from certain
constraints either to do it or not to do it."61 Philosophers distinguish
between two basic types of constraints on individual conduct: formal
constraints and material constraints.62 They define "liberty" as the
absence of a formal constraint-the absence of a positive external
normative constraint or duty requiring one to act (or refrain from
acting) in a particular way.63 So, to have the liberty to do x is to have
58. E.g., GuTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 264 (arguing that in the case of soft paternalism
that the "tendency of denying that there is any 'real' infringement of liberty... is especially dangerous"
and that "[ijt is preferable, even from a Millian perspective, to concede that liberty is limited in this
case"); KuLTGEN, supra note 3, at 118, 219-20; Rosemary Carter, Justifying Paternalism, 7 CANADIAN
J. PHIL. 133, 138 (1977) ("Mill ... ignor[es] the fact that the subject does want to cross the bridge, and
that we are preventing him from attempting to satisfy that desire.").
59. KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 58.
60. Cf Cass. R. Sunstein & Richard Tbaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not An Oxymoron, 71 U.
Cau. L. REv. (forthcoming 2003) ("A slightly more aggressive form of paternalism occurs when the
default plan is accompanied by procedural constraints, designed to ensure that any departure is fully
voluntary and entirely rational. When procedural constraints are in place, it is not costless to depart from
the default plan.").
61. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 202 (1971) (emphasis added).
62. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 168 & n.92 (drawing a distinction between
decisional and executional autonomy); Kent Greenawalt, Some Related Limits of Law, in THE LIMITS OF
LAW 76, 77 n.1 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1974) (making a distinction between
positive liberty and negative liberty); Bailey Kuklin, Self-Paternalism in the Marketplace, 60 U. CIN. L.
REv. 649, 653 n.4 (1992) (distinguishing between "material freedom (freedom in fact)" and "formal
freedom (freedom in principle)").
63. Cf FEINBERO, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 18, at 8-9, 246 n.4; FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF,
supra note 18, at 62-65; Joel Feinberg, Freedom and Liberty, in 3 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 753, 753 (Edward Craig ed., 1998) [hereinafter Feinberg, Freedom]; Harris, Adult
Behavior, supra note 24, at 581. Rawls described physical constraints as affecting the "worth of liberty."
RAWLS, supra note 61, at 204. But I prefer to describe such constraints as impacting the individual's
freedom.
20041
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the de jure ability to do x.64 Philosophers, on the other hand, define
freedom as the absence of a material constraint-the absence of a
physical (or other effective) constraint preventing one from acting in
a particular way.65 So, to have the freedom to do x is to have the de
facto ability to do x.
Jonathan Schonsheck explained that "the enactment of a criminal
law does not, strictly speaking, 'prevent' people from electing the
proscribed activity." 66 The law typically affects only one's liberty and
not one's freedom. Tim Gray, for example, contended that "a legal
impediment .. .does not render an agent unfree, since she can
(physically) perform the illegal act, and take the consequences."
67
Rather, Gray argued that "laws ... leave the agent free in another
respect-to yield or not yield to the sanction.
68
The following examples help to clarify the difference in meaning
between liberty and freedom. I am not at liberty to drive faster than
75 miles per hour on the interstate highway because state law
imposes on me a duty to drive within the posted speed limits.
However, because I drive a Cadillac and because there is not much
traffic on the highway, I am free to drive faster than 75 miles per
hour. That is, although I may be punished for speeding or for reckless
driving, I am physically able to drive at that speed. I can drive 75
miles per hour but may not do so. Conversely, were I driving in rural
Montana, where the legal speed limit is 100 miles per hour, and a
rock slide made the road impassable, that would affect only my
freedom, not my liberty. I would be physically unable to drive at 75
miles per hour (or to drive at all), but this constraint on my conduct is
a feature of my material circumstances and not a legal duty. I may
drive 75 miles per hour but cannot do so.
64. This corresponds to Hohfeld's first sense of "right" See WESLEY NEWCOMS HOHFELD,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (Walter Wheeler Cook ed.,
1919).
65. Cf. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 18, at 8-9 & n.4; FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra
note 18, at 62-65; Feinberg, Freedom, supra note 63, at 753.
66. SCHONSHECK, supra note 28, at 9; see also HAYRY, MEDICAL PATERNALISM, supra note 27, at
41.42; Husak, Liberal Neutrality, supra note 27, at 69; Grant LaMond, The Coerciveness of Law, 20
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (2000); H. Steiner, Individual Liberty, 75 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 33,
36 (1974-75).
67. TIMGRAY, FREEDOM23 (1991).
68. Id. at 26.
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While soft paternalism is not an autonomy-limiting principle under
these definitions, it is a liberty-limiting principle. Gerald Dworkin
argued that with soft paternalism, "[i]n limiting his liberty .. .we
promote, not hinder, his [autonomy]. 69 John Kleinig similarly
argued that "in the case of invasions of liberty, autonomy may not
always be threatened[:] weak paternalism need involve no threat to
autonomy. ' 7° Donald VanDeVeer was even more explicit, arguing:
"Even if we concede that stopping S against his will .. .does not
thwart any intention of S ... it remains true .. that the intervener
does restrict S's liberty of action.
71
Heta Hayry drew a helpful distinction, which might elucidate how
soft paternalism can be a liberty-limiting principle yet still protect
and preserve the subject's autonomy. Hdyry distinguished actions
that do not interfere with individual liberty at all, such as the mere
provision of information, from those that do interfere with individual
liberty pursuant to any liberty-limiting principle.72 Unfortunately,
Hayry used the terms "hard" and "soft" to make this new
distinction.73 These terms bear little relationship in meaning to the
terms I employ. To mark the distinction between the concepts that I
define as "hard" and "soft," Hayry used the terms strong and weak. I




(Not in need of justification) WeakH 
Strong
I (i.e. Soft) (i.e. Hard)
69. DwoRKIN, AUTONOMY, supra note 37, at 106.
70. KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 21, 58, 100.
71. VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 30 n.20.
72. HErA HAYRY, INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND MEDICAL CONTROL 42 (1998) [hereinafter HAYRY,
MEDICAL CONTROL]; see also HAYRY, MEDICAL PATERNALISM, supra note 27, at 76-77; Hlayry,
Paternalism, supra note 38, at 453; NIKKU, supra note 3, at 128 n.2.
73. HAYRY, MEDICAL CONTROL, supra note 72, at 42.
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For Hdiyry, measures such as education and rational persuasion-
what Mitsuhiro Umezo, interestingly, called "verbal paternalism" 74 -
were not even prima facie in need of justification because they do not
limit individual liberty.7 5  Hdyry called such measures softH
paternalism.
76
Even Mill allowed that an individual's own good is "good reason
for remonstrating with him, or persuading him, or entreating him".
7
In contrast to force and threats, (1) education, (2) advice, and (3)
rational persuasion do not violate the subject's autonomy.78 Indeed,
74. MITSUHIRO UMEzo, PATERNALISM IN JAPANESE BUSINESS ETHICS 21 (unpublished dissertation
1999).
75. HAYRY, MEDICAL CONTROL, supra note 72, at 41, 50, 57-65, 73; see also NIKKU, supra note 3,
at 198; Dan W. Brock & Steven A. Wartman, When Competent Patients Make Irrational Choices, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 109, 110 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 4th ed.
1994) ("Noncoercive and nonxnanipulative attempts to persuade patients of the irrational and harmful
nature of their choices do not violate their right of self-determination. Instead, they reflect an appropriate
responsibility and concern for the patients' well-being."); Moore, supra note 24, at 108; Seana Valentine
Shifflin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 213
(2000) ("By engaging with B's capacities and showing respect for B's power to decide what to aim for,
A respects and engages with B's agency.. . ."); Sunstein, Legal Interference, supra note 39, at 625;
Weale, Invisible Hand, supra note 24, at 789 ("Because measures of persuasion still allow individuals
the final freedom of choice as to whether to engage in the action or not, we might say that the use of the
policy instrument of persuasion is not paternalist in the way that the use of other policy instruments is.").
76. HAYRY, MEDICAL CONTROL, supra note 72, at 42.
77. ON LBERTY, supra note 53, at 68; see also id at 142 ("[D]isinterested benevolence can find
other instruments to persuade people to find their good than whips and scourges, either of the literal or
the metaphorical sort.").
78. See, e.g., BEAuCHAwP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 166; NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH
CARE 158 (1985); DWORPiN, AUTONOMY, supra note 37, at 21; FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note
18, at 134 ("The way for the state to assure itself that [smoking] practices are truly voluntary is
continually to confront smokers with the ugly medical facts so that there is no escaping the knowledge
of what the medical risks exactly are."); KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 101 ("[K]nowledge enhances her
chance of choosing actions that will succeed in their purpose."); id at 70 ("[R]ational persuasion hardly
needs justification."); PETER MCWILLIAMS, AIN'T NOBODY'S BUSINESS IF YOU Do: THE ABSURDITY OF
CONSENSUAL CRIMES IN OUR FREE COUNTRY 608-09 (1996); RILEY, supra note 51, at 122, 145
("[G]ovemment should provide relevant information but otherwise leave individuals alone .... ."); id at
162 ("[Plersuasion, advice, counsel, encouragement, attempts to inform and the like, are not the same
thing as coercion."); VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 128 ("[I]t is permissible to use fair, open, [sic]
means to dissuade him."); id. at 317 ("[Aln information-providing policy is defensible.... ."); id at 321-
22,424; J. Howard Beales III, Modification and Consumer Information: Modern Biotechnology and the
Regulation ofInformation, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 105, 112 n.42 (2000) ("There is nothing 'paternalistic'
about relying on scientific assessments of risk to determine whether mandatory labeling is
appropriate."); Beauchamp, Medical Paternalism, supra note 51, at 132; Dworkin, Paternalism-
MORALITY, supra note 6, at 110, 124; Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, supra note 48, at 11; Richard M.
Gilbert, Ethical Considerations in the Prevention of Smoking in Adults and Children, 8 MEDICOLEGAL
NEWS 4, 5 (1980); Donald H. Regan, Paternalism, Freedom, Identit, and Commitment, in
PATERNALISM 113, 114-15 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983); Daniel Wilder, Persuasion and Coercion for
Health: Ethical Issues in Government Efforts to Change Life-Styles, in PATERNALISM 35, 53 (Rolf
Sartorius ed., 1983); Daniel Wilder & Dan E. Beauchamp, Health Promotion and Health Education, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1126, 1127 (Warren T. Reich ed., 1995).
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these measures often enable subjects to be more autonomous by
making the subjects more aware of their options. Admittedly,
education might influence a subject's decisions, but only an extreme
form of influence-manipulation--comes close to forcing or
determining choice.79 In contrast to the use of persuasion and
education (two forms of softH paternalism), the use of force and
threats does restrict individual liberty. Hayry called such measures
hardH paternalism.80 Thus, what this Article refers to as hard and soft
paternalism-and Hayry referred to as weakH  and strongH
paternalism-are each categories of Hdyry's hardH paternalism. Only
hard paternalism, in Hyry's sense, requires justification pursuant to
a liberty-limiting principle because only it limits liberty."' Not all
interpersonal interaction is liberty-limiting, but soft paternalism is
liberty-limiting.
2
Hayry's model illustrates that soft paternalism does restrict liberty,
although for a justifiable reason.8 3 That is, soft paternalism is a form
of harda paternalism. It demands a justification, which softH
measures do not demand.84 Furthermore, soft paternalism provides
reasons that are sufficiently distinct from those provided by the harm
principle. For these reasons, we ought to retain soft paternalism as an
independent liberty-limiting principle.
79. See, e.g., BERNARD GERT ET AL., BIOETHICS: A RETURN TO FUNDAMENTALS 211-12 (1997)
(providing an example of informative paternalism); KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 71, 214, 221-22; NiKu,
supra note 3, at 23 ([1]nformative actions can be performed paternalistically... ."); id at 199 ("[Ihe
purpose of health information is not only improved knowledge but also a steering of habits towards what
authorities consider health-promotive and right behavior. . . . When this is performed through
information we may talk about informative paternalism.") (emphasis added); Allen E. Buchanan,
Medical Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 61, 62 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983); Ruth R. Faden & Alan 1.
Faden, Preface, to Ethical Issues in Public Health Policy: Health Education and Lifestyle Interventions,
6 HEALTH EDUC. MONOGRAPHS 177, 180 (1978) (arguing that although education facilitates voluntary
choice, as it becomes more persuasive, government bears a heavier burden of justification); Perri 6,
supra note 18, at 156-57; Douglas J. Uyl, Smoking, Human Rights, and Civil Liberties, in SMOKING:
WHO HAS THE RIGHT? 267, 272 (Jeffrey A. Schuler & Magda E. Schuler eds., 1998) (arguing that the
expenditure of public funds for smoking education is unjustifiable hard patemalism).
80. HAYRY, MEDICAL CONTROL, supra note 72, at 63-64, 71, 129-30. Education is, in Heta Hlyry's
terminology, not only not strong4 (that is, hard as used in this Article) paternalism but it is not even
hardH paternalism (that is, prima facie in need of justification). Id at 73; see also id. at 57-65; NiKKU,
supra note 3, at 198; Sunstein, Legal Interference, supra note 39, at 1165.
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C. Admonitions for Using Soft Paternalism
There are two final points about soft paternalism. First, motive is
an underemphasized defining condition of soft paternalism. Soft (or
weak) paternalism does not authorize intervention simply because the
subject acts (that is, happens to act) without substantial
voluntariness. 85 As John Kleinig explained, "[w]eak paternalistic
impositions are not justified merely because their beneficiaries lack
autarchy. As Mill makes clear, such impositions must be directed to
the 'improvement' of those on whom they are laid .... In other
words, the end of weak paternalism must be autarchy."
8 6
To qualify as soft paternalism, the agent's motive for liberty
limitation must be either (1) to protect the subject from harm or from
failure to procure a benefit, to which the subject did not consent, or
(2) to ensure or confirm that the subject really did consent to the
harm or failure.8 7  An agent cannot justify intervention with a
subject's liberty as soft paternalism simply because the subject
happens to be acting without substantial voluntariness."8 That would
be post hoc rationalization. A subject's lack of substantial
85. See, e.g., ARMSDEN, supra note 27, at 93; GERT ET AL., supra note 79, at 226 (arguing that
"[just because people are not competent to make a rational decision does not mean that it is justified to
violate any moral rule with regard to them"); HAYRY, MEDICAL PATERNALISM, supra note 27, at 70;
KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 141 ("The fact that a paternalistic imposition is weak does not mean that it is
therefore morally unproblematic."); KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 8 ("This solicitude is constructive."); id.
at 20; Id. at 53 ("The kinds and extent of control which they legitimately exert, however, are strictly
limited by the ultimate objective-to prepare their children for autonomy .... ."); id at 54, 59, 78;
LOCKE, supra note 3, 2D TREATISE § 57, at 348 ("iTihe end of Law is not to abolish or restrain but to
preserve and encourage freedom .... ."); VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 354-55 (arguing that the mere
presence of some lack of voluntariness does not imply a forfeiture of ascriptive autonomy); Fred R.
Berger, Paternalism and Autonomy, in THE RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY 37, 47-48 (Thomas Attig et al. eds.,
1985); Joan C. Callahan, Liberty, Beneficence, and Involuntary Confinement, 9 J. MED. & PHIL. 261,
286 (1984); Childress & Campbell, supra note 27, at 125 (denying that soft paternalism automatically
justified intervention and requiring that soft paternalism employ the least restrictive means, prevent
serious harm, and be proportional to its negative effects); Jack D. Douglas, Cooperative Paternalism
Versus Conflicfd Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 171, 174-75 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983) (contrasting
"cooperative paternalism" in which the agent helps the subject become more competent and "conflictful
paternalism" in which the agent does not have that aim); Hospers, supra note 45, at 265 (arguing that the
agent must not impose his values onto the subject-even when the subject acts without substantial
voluntariness; under such circumstances, the agent must act to help the subject); Jorgensen, supra note
47, at 48; Michael Lavin, Substance Abuse: Smoking, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BiOETHICs 2422, 2423
(Warren T. Reich ed., 1995).
86. KLEIG, supra note 3, at 31, 214.
87. See C. Edwin Harris, Jr., Paternalism and the Enforcement of Morality, 8 Sw. J. PHL. 85, 91
(1977) [hereinafter Harris, Paternalism].
88. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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voluntariness is not a forfeiture of the right to autonomy. The agent's
motive matters. A causal connection between the subject's lack of
substantial voluntariness and the agent's intervention must exist. The
agent must intervene primarily because the subject acts without
substantial voluntariness. s9
Second, philosophers often propound soft paternalism not only as a
positive thesis for liberty limitation but also as a negative thesis. This
negative thesis is that only soft paternalism, and no other form of
self-regarding liberty-limiting principle, is ever justified.90 Thus, John
Kultgen described soft paternalism as "hard antiparentalism" because
it is hard set against (real, strong, or hard) paternalism.9 1 In contrast,
hard paternalism, as the next subsection discusses, is soft
antiparentalism; it sanctions intervention with even substantially
voluntary conduct.
92
III. THE DEFINITION OF HARD PATERNALISM
Typical examples of hard paternalism include the state-mandated
utilization of seatbelts, motorcycle helmets, protective clothing,
vaccination, red caps for hunters, and fluoridation. Other examples
include state-mandated prohibition or controls on the use of
recreational drugs, gambling, alcohol, and tobacco. These are all
politically, morally, and ethically controversial issues. So, it should
come as no surprise that academics consider hard legal paternalism to
be both the most interesting and the most striking liberty-limiting
principle.
93
89. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 60 (arguing that soft paternalistic "constraints are justified not on
the ground that the planner disagrees with people's choices, but because identifiable features of the
situation make it likely that choices will be defective"). Michael D. Bayles, Book Review, 7 L. & PHIL.
107, 115 (1988) (reviewing FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18) (noting that the agent's motive
for interfering must be to counteract the subject's lack of understanding).
90. See, e.g., FEINBERo, HARM TO SELF, Supra note 18, at 3, 15.
91. KULTOEN, supra note 3, at 132; see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 279 ("It is
therefore doubtful that weak paternalism as a moral position can be distinguished from antipaternalism.
92. See, e.g., KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 132; FEINBERa, HARM TO SELF, Supra note 18, at 15;
FEINBERO, HARMLEsS WRONGDOwnO, supra note 6, at xvii.
93. Tom L. Beauchamp, Paternalism and Refisals to Sterilize, in RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBiUTIES IN
MODERN MEDICINE 137, 142 (Marc D. Basson ed., 1981) [hereinafter Beauchamp, Refisals to Sterilize];
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A clear and complete definition of hard paternalism is essential to
an inquiry regarding the moral justifiability of hard paternalistic
measures. Bernard Gert and Charles Culver, for example, recognized
that the definition of hard paternalism is not a mere preliminary
matter, writing that "a dispute about the proper use of a word... can
have significant practical consequences." 94 Duncan Kennedy wrote
even more forcefully, describing the conceptual questions
surrounding paternalism as "intertwined with the [moral] question."
95
The definition of the hard paternalism liberty-limiting principle has
almost everything to do with whether it is justified, and to what
extent.96 Richard J. Arneson cautioned that "[p]aternalism will look
Beauchamp, Medical Paternalism, supra note 5 1, at 138-39; Beauchamp, Paternalism, supra note 38, at
1916.
94. GERT ET AL., supra note 79, at 196, 227; see also JULIAN BAGOINI & PETER S. FOSL, THE
PHILOSOPHER'S TOOLKIT: A COMPENDIUM OF PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS AND METHODS 28-29 (2003);
Arthur L Caplan, The Concepts of Health, Illness, and Disease, in MEDICAL ETHICS 57, 61 (Robert M.
Veatch ed., 2d ed. 1997).
95. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 644.
96. See, e.g., BLOKLAND, supra note 47, at 158 ("Before going into a number of possible
justifications of paternalism, it is desirable to first demarcate this concept somewhat and make some
distinctions."); CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 12 ("My task is to determine the adequacy of paternalistic
justifications in health care. It is thus necessary to define paternalism more precisely.") (emphasis
added); CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, supra note 30, at 33.
Here the central problem is whether this form of justification [(paternalism)] for a
restriction of liberty may ever validly be invoked, and, if so, how the principle that stands
behind this judgment is to be formulated. In order to answer this question, we must look
more closely at the nature of patemalism.
Id (emphasis added); FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 18, at 16 ("Philosophical inquiries into
principles and concepts can have practical usefulness if and only because in the present stage of public
discussion of legislative issues, the abstract level is where the most serious confusions are located.")
(emphasis omitted); id at 17; id. at 65 ("[Vagueness cannot be tolerated in a concept that is to be put to
such important normative uses."); KLEINIO, supra note 3, at xii ("As it turns out, not everything that is
dubbed 'paternalistic' is so, and even where some paternalism is involved, it is not always the kind of
paternalism charged by critics."); NIKKU, supra note 3, at 32 ("Before this ethical conflict is further
analyzed we need to define the paternalistic action. . . .") (emphasis added); id at 61 ("Lleave the
ethical analysis and the moral judgement of the action until after the definition... .") (emphasis added);
MICHAEL J. TREBmLCOCK, THE LMrs OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 19-20 (1993); JuLiE A'NE WHITE,
DEMOCRACY, JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE: RECONSTRUCTING PUBLIC CARE 13 (2000);
Beauchamp, Biobehavioral Control, supra note 51, at 66 ("Whether paternalistic reasons are good
reasons will occupy us momentarily, but first some agreement must be reached concerning proper use of
the word 'paternalism.'"); M. Gregg Bloche, Beyond Autonomy: Coercion and Morality in Clinical
Relationshos, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 229, 240 (1996) ('[C]onceptual analysis... is a prerequisite for
[moral assessment] to be fruitful."); Caplan, supra note 94, at 61 ("[T'he definition of these terms is
more than a philosophical exercise."); id. at 70; Moore, supra note 24, at 62 ("Political philosophy
maximizes its chances of arriving at better answers when its questions are well framed.. . ."); Valdar
Parve, Value-Neutral Paternalism, 219 BOST. STUD. IN THE PHIL. OF SCIENCE 271 (2001); Shapiro,
supra note 4, at 525 (noting "the close relationship between questions of definition and ofjustification")
(emphasis added); Id at 522; Alan Soble, Paternalism Liberal Theory and Suicide, 12 CANADIAN J.
PHIL. 335, 335 (1982); Weale, Invisible Hand supra note 24, at 787 ("Mwo of these problems [of
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more inviting morally than in fact it is, if we fail to separate actual
cases of paternalistic restriction from cases which look similar but
upon examination prove to be based on reasons of an altogether
different sort.",97 VanDeVeer echoed this concern, writing:
Our ultimate focus in this study concerns the justifiability of
paternalistic acts. We want to evaluate them. But when is an act
correctly described as a "paternalistic act"? The latter is a
conceptual issue; the former is an evaluative one. In familiar
discussions these two questions often get confused and, as a
result, the inquiry or dispute gets muddled.9
In short, before addressing moral issues surrounding hard
paternalism, focusing on the conceptual issues is important in order
to know precisely what we are talking about.
99
To help prevent the muddling of conceptual and normative issues,
I will carefully and precisely define hard paternalism. First, I will
paternalism] are definitional and two are judgmental. An underlying theme of my argument will be that
it is difficult in many respects to separate these two types of issues") (emphasis added); Albert Weale,
Paternalism, in THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 367,368 (David Miller ed.,
1987) (explaining that identification and justification are separate tasks); Weale, Paternalism, supra note
18, at 172 (noting that the "difficulty comes not so much with stipulating what conditions patemalism
has to satisfy before it is legitimate, but in knowing when cases fall under the appropriate heading"); id
at 157; Winick, supra note 18, at 18, 26.
97. Arneson, Mill Versus, supra note 41, at 472 (emphasis added); see also CONTEMPORARY ISSUES,
supra note 30, at 34 ("One critical element of this controversy thus concerns the quality of
understanding and also of consent or refusal by the persons whose autonomy might be restricted by such
policies."). More precisely, shaping the available conceptual boxes is particularly important given at
least one (legal realist) model of decisionmaking. Suppose a judge or legislator reaches a decision based
on her emotions. She must then find a rationale for her decision. If the available rationales are well-
defined, the judge or legislator may sometimes find that she cannot plausibly employ the available
rationales, and she will find that she must reconsider her decision. Cf. Herman Oliphant, A Return to
Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 75 (1928); Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 261 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
98. VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 5, 16.
99. See, e.g., G.E. MOORE, ETHICS v (1947) ("It appears that in ethics, as in all other philosophical
studies, the difficulties and disagreements of which history is full, are mainly due to a very simple cause:
namely to the attempt to answer questions, without first discovering precisely what question it is you
desire to answer."); JOHN SHAND, ARGUING WELL 48 (2000) ("1f there is uncertainty over the meaning
of words used in an argument, we will be at a loss as to how to assess it and determine whether it is a
good argument or not."); Michael Wreen, The Definition of Euthanasia, 48 PHIL. &
PHENONENOLOGIcAL RES. 637, 637 (1988); see also BEAUCHAMP, ETHICS, supra note 22, at 4 ("The
purpose of ethical theory is to introduce clarity, substance, and precision of argument into the domain of
morality."); id at 27, 39-40 (noting that what might seem like moral conflict can often be resolved by
clarifying the concepts involved).
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provide a very brief etymology of hard paternalism. Second, I will
propose a definition of hard paternalism containing logically
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. In Part IV, I
will consider and rebut objections and counterexamples to my
definition.
A. A Brief Etymology of "Hard Paternalism"
Legal and ethical issues surrounding hard paternalism date back to
at least the early days of the Enlightenment. Three notable examples
exist. First, in his 1698 Second Treatise on Government, John Locke
cautioned against confounding "paternal" and "political" power.
100
Second, in his 1793 On the Old Saw: That May Be Right in Theory
But It Won't Work in Practice, Immanuel Kant similarly cautioned
that "[i]f a government were founded on the principle of benevolence
toward the people, as a father's toward his children-in other words,
if it were a paternalistic government (imperium paternale)... -such
a government would be the worst conceivable despotism."'' 1 Third,
also before the end of the 18th century, Jeremy Bentham, in The
Principles of Morals and Legislation, questioned whether "self
regarding offences" are a proper subject of the criminal law.'
0 2
Nevertheless, the concept of paternalism did not acquire a distinct
philosophical identity for another half-century, when it was
systematically attacked by Mill in his 1859 monograph On Liberty. 1
03
Mill helped refine the issue of paternalism, but Mill never employed
the term. The term paternalism did not appear in published literature
until the 1880s.
104
It was not until the early 1960s--during and after the famous and
widely read debate between H.L.A. Hart and Patrick Devlin over the
legal enforcement of morality-that "paternalism" was materially
100. LOCKE, supra note 3,2DTATISE §§ 52, 170.
101. IMMANUEL KANT, ON THE OLD SAW: THAT MAY BE RIGT IN THEORY BUT IT WON'T WORK IN
PRACTICE 58-59 (E.B. Ashton trs., 1974) (1793) (emphasis omitted).
102. BENTHAM, supra note 39, at ch. XIII, § 1, par. iv; ch. XVI, paras. viii, xv, xiv.
103. See ON LIBERTY, supra note 53.
104. CLDRESS, supra note 3, at 4; KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 3; KuLTGEN, supra note 3, at 249 ch. 5
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refined and specified beyond what Mill had done. °5 Following the
Hart-Devlin debate, philosophers devoted significant attention to the
issue of paternalism. Soon, philosophers further refined the concept,
and the narrower concept hard paternalism emerged. Feinberg first
introduced the concept of hard paternalism in his widely reprinted
1971 article Legal Paternalism. 1
06
Rather than surveying the literature on definitions of "hard
paternalism," I will proceed to formulate my own definition, drawing
upon the definitions of other philosophers and law professors as
appropriate.
B. The Four Logically Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Which
Define Hard Paternalism
My definition of hard paternalism is an evaluatively neutral,
nonprescriptive definition. Here, I identify the conditions under
which liberty limitation is hard paternalism, but I leave for another
day the question of whether and when hard paternalism is justifiable.
I will define hard paternalism by intension as action by the agent of
liberty-limitation that restricts the subject's liberty when the agent
satisfies four necessary and sufficient conditions.1 °7 After briefly
stating these four conditions, I will defend each as logically necessary
and the four as jointly sufficient to define hard paternalism.
First, the paternalistic agent must intentionally limit the subject's
liberty. The limitation must be hardH in Hdyry's sense of the term.
1 8
Hard paternalism is, after all, a liberty-limiting principle.' 0 9 Second,
the agent must limit the subject's liberty primarily because she
105. See FEINBERO, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 375. See generally PATRICK DEVLIN, THE
ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 132-35 (1965); H.LA. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 31-33 (1963).
106. Feinberg, Legal Paternaism, supra note 48.
107. See SHAND, supra note 99, at 49,55.
108. See Hayry, Paternalism, supra note 38, at 453.
109. See, e.g., ARMSDEN, supra note 27, at 16-17, 23-24; CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 12-13;
DWORmIN, AUTONOMY, supra note 37, at 123 ("There must be a usupation of decision making .... ");
JONATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVINo LIVES 77 (1977); KLEMNO, supra note 3, at 7;
KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 213; NDCKU, supra note 3, at 50; VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 17; Arneson,
Mill Versus, supra note 41, at 471; Beauchamp, Reflsals to Sterilize, supra note 93, at 138; Beauchamp,
Medical Paternalism, supra note 51, at 125; Buchanan, supra note 79, at 62; Dworkin, Paternalism-
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 44, at 940; Marion Smiley, Paternalism and Democracy, 23 J. VALUE
INQUIRY 299, 308-09 (1989); Thompson, supra note 47, at 247-48.
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believes that intervention will contribute to the subject's welfare. The
agent must intervene with a benevolent motive either to confer a
benefit upon or to avert harm from the subject. Third, the agent's
benevolent motive must be independent from the subject's
contemporaneous preferences. Otherwise, the agent will be a
facilitator rather than a limiter. Fourth, the agent must either (1)
disregard the fact that the subject engages in the restricted conduct
substantially voluntarily (that is, substantially free both from
controlling influences l0 and from epistemic defects"'1) or (2)
deliberately limit the subject's substantially voluntary conduct.
Otherwise, the agent's limitation would be soft paternalism.
1. Condition One: The Agent Must Intentionally Limit the
Subject's Liberty
The most basic condition of hard paternalism, and any liberty-
limiting principle, is that the paternalistic agent must intentionally
and actually limit the subject's liberty. Liberty-limiting principles are,
after all, reasons for overcoming the presumption of non-interference
with individual liberty. 1 12 So, first the agent must cause some
interference. As Gerald Dworkin explained, "P acts paternalistically
toward Q if and only if.. . P's act is a limitation of Q's autonomy or
liberty." 113 It is a necessary condition of hard paternalism that the
agent intentionally limit the subject's liberty.114
110. See general RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 238,256-62 (1986); FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 145-59, 189-228; C.L. TEN,
MILL ON LIBERTY 60 (1980).
111. See generally FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 110, at 238,248-55; HARM TO SELF, supra note
18, at 159-62; TEN, supra note 110, at 60.
112. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP, MORAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 389; BEAUCHAMP, ETHICS, supra
note 22, at 353; CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, supra note 30, at 32; FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note
18, at 9-10, 187; FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at ix, 25, 374; FEINBERG, HARMLESS
WRONGDOING, supra note 6, at ix, 66. 321, 323. Moreover, this condition is necessary for distinguishing
paternalism from other species of benevolence. See Simon Clarke, A Definition of Paternalism, 5
CRITICAL REV. INTL. SOC. & POL. PHIL. 81, 82-83 (2002).
113. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 649, 649
(Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Dworkin, Paternalism-CAMBRIDGE]; see also Richard J.
Arneson, Paternalism, in 7 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 250, 250 (Edward Craig ed.,
1998) [hereinafter Arneson, Paternalism] ("The paradigm of paternalism . . . is the restriction of
people's liberty ....); Beauchamp, Paternalism, supra note 38, at 1914; Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism:
Some Second Thoughts, in PATERNALISM 107 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983) [hereinafter Dworkin, Second
Thoughts] ("There must be a usurpation of decision making . ... "); Dworkin, Paternalism-
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We should construe limitation broadly in this context.115 It is
sufficient that the paternalistic agent intentionally acts as an obstacle
to either the subject's formulation or implementation of substantially
voluntary decisions. 116 An agent may intentionally limit a subject's
liberty in at least three distinct ways, which are illustrated below in
the context of a doctor-patient relationship." 7 First, a paternalistic
physician could physically limit a subject, constraining both the
subject's liberty and her freedom. 118 The physician might, for
example, administer a blood transfusion to a Jehovah's Witness
against that patient's substantially voluntarily expressed preference to
not receive a blood transfusion."
19
Second, the paternalistic physician might limit the patient's liberty
by omission or nonacquiescence. 120  Instead of actively doing
something contrary to the patient's wishes, the physician might refuse
to facilitate the subject's decisions. For example, the physician might
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 44, at 940; Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS
1282 (Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., 2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter Dworkin,
Paternalism--ETHiCs]; Shiffrin, supra note 75, at 218 ("[Platernalism by A toward B may be
characterized as behavior.. . that involves the substitution of A's judgment or agency for B's ..
114. Dworkin, Paternalism-CAMBRDOE, supra note 113, at 649.
115. E.g., Clarke, supra note 112, at 82-83; Dworkin, Paternalisn-ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 44, at
940; George W. Rainbolt, Prescription Drug Laws: Justyled Hard Paternalism, 3 BioETHIcs 45, 46
(1989). Commentators have debated whether paternalism includes noncoercive measures. See, e.g.,
GERT ET AL., supra note 79, at 200. As indicated in Section 1, noncoercive measures can be paternalistic.
For example, nondisclosure of material information is a limitation of liberty that can be done for
paternalistic reasons. Id at 210 (broadening the notion of limiting freedom). Paternalism may even
sometimes include the deliberate manipulation of default rules and arrangements. See Sunstein &
Thaler, supra note 60. Sunstein and Thaler focus their argument on cases which would appropriately be
characterized as soft paternalism. However, their "libertarian paternalism" cuts across the distinction
between hard and soft paternalism.
116. The limitation is, in other words, with the subject's negative liberty. A failure to expand the
subject's available options is not a limitation. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980). Of
course, the distinction between negative and positive liberty is vague and depends on the specification of
a baseline of opportunity. Id
117. The agent might also accidentally or unintentionally limit the subject's liberty. In a crowded
world, people are always getting in each other's way. However, absent a deliberate act, neither hard
paternalism nor any other liberty limiting principle applies.
118. Bernard Gert & Charles M. Culver, Paternalistic Behavior, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 45,46 (1976).
119. Id.
120. E.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 127, 270-71,288; CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at
19, 132, 241; KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 213; Childress & Campbell, supra note 27, at 124 ("In active
nonacquiescence, the paternalist refuses to accept a patient's request for nonintervention or
noninterference, while in passive nonacquiescence, a paternalist refuses to carry out the wishes or
choices of a patient or to assist the patient in his or her action."); Shifflin, supra note 75, at 213.
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refuse to implement the patient's request for a treatment that the
physician considers inappropriate.
12 1
Third, the paternalistic physician might limit the patient's liberty
by altering the patient's options. 122 For example, the physician might
lie to the patient about her chances for recovery, thereby limiting her
options by concealing their availability. 123 Deception limits the
subject's liberty to exercise choice by interfering with the choice-
making process. 1
24
Philosophical literature has captured many of the various methods
through which an agent can limit a subject's liberty in several
conceptual distinctions. 125 The pervasiveness of these distinctions in
the philosophical literature and the foundational nature of the
interference condition warrants a brief discussion of these
distinctions. The distinctions describing the manner of the agent's
liberty limitation include those between: (1) direct and indirect
paternalism; (2) active and passive paternalism; (3) compulsive and
coercive paternalism; and (4) contemporaneous, retrospective, and
prospective paternalism.
a. Direct and Indirect Paternalism
To be paternalistic, the agent must limit the subject's liberty.
126
However, the agent need not do so directly; philosophers have
121. E.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 288.
122. Allen Buchanan, Medical Paternalism, 7 PHIL. & PUB. APT. 370,371-72 (1978).
123. E.g., id at 373; Dworkin, Second Thought, supra note 113, at 106.
124. E.g., Gerald Dworkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent, In PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETmCAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED
CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP: VOLUME THREE: APPENDICES STUDIES ON
THE FOUNDATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT 63, 69-70 (1982); BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3,
at 126 ("This lie denies the patient information he may need to determine his future course of action...
."); DAN W. BROCK, Informed Consent, in LIFE AND DEATH: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS IN BIOMEDICAL
ETmCS 21, 29-30 (1993); THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 152, 164; Beauchamp, Paternalism, supra note
38, at 1916 ("Strong paternalism usurps autonomy either by restricting the information available to a
person or overriding the person's informed and voluntary choices.... For example, a strong paternalist
would prevent a patient capable of autonomous choice from receiving diagnostic information that might
lead to suicide."); Jane S. Zembaty, A Limited Defense of Paternalism in Medicine, n BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 60, 62 (Thomas A. Mappes & Jane S. Zembaty eds., 1981).
125. These are "accidental" properties of hard paternalism because they are neither necessary nor
sufficient for liberty limitation to be hard paternalism. See SHAND, supra note 99, at 49-50.
126. Dworkin, Paternalism--CAMBRIDGE, supra note 113, at 649.
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distinguished between direct and indirect paternalism.127 With direct
paternalism, the agent limits the liberty of only the subject for the
benefit of the subject.128 An example of direct paternalism is banning
the smoking of cigarettes. 129 The state restricts the liberty of only
smokers (primarily) for the good of the smokers. In indirect
paternalism, on the other hand, the agent restricts the liberty of third
parties for the benefit of the subject. 130  An example of indirect
paternalism is a ban on the manufacture and sale of cigarettes.' 3 ' The
state restricts the liberty of manufacturers, not for their own benefit
but rather for the benefit of their customers (smokers).
The intended effect in both the direct paternalism and the indirect
paternalism examples is the same: to prevent individuals from
smoking tobacco and harming their health. 13 2 However, with indirect
paternalism, the agent has not aimed the restrictive power of law at
the smokers who are the intended beneficiaries of the law. Rather, the
law aims to stop the manufacturers who provide the product that is
instrumental to the smokers' harm.
133
Indirect paternalism is a complex and sometimes confusing
concept, and it might, at first, seem subsumable under the harm
principle. 134  After all, both liberty-limiting principles seem to
127. E.g., CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 18; FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 9; KLEINIG,
supra note 3, at 11-14; KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 165-66; Nils Holtug, The Harm Principle, 5 ETHICAL
THEORY & MORAL PRACTICE 357, 360 (2002) (using the terms "origin-centered" and "origin-neutral");
Weale, Paternalism, supra note 18, at 161-62; see also MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PRINCIPLES OF
LEGISLATION: THE USES OF POLITICAL AuTHORTY 119, 121 (1978); Paul Turner Hershey, A Definition
for Paternalism, 10 J. MED. & PHIL. 171, 180-81 (1985); Steven Lee, On the Justification of
Paternalism, 7 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 193, 194 (1981). Unfortunately, this distinction is sometimes
referred to using the terms "pure" and "impure."
128. See, e.g., DwORKIN, AUTONOMY, supra note 37, at 125 (isolating "safety cases" where the focus
is individual conduct).
129. See CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 18.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id.; KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 14.
133. Scholars sometimes find that indirect paternalism is harder to justify because those whose liberty
is restricted do not even receive a so-called benefit. See, e.g., Dworkin, Paternalism--MORALITY, supra
note 6, at 111; KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 11, 14. But see TORBIORN TANNSJO, COERCIVE CARE: THE
ETHICS OF CHOICE IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE 76-77 (1999) (defending "well-behaved paternalism,"
which is limited to indirect paternalism).
134. See ARMSDEN, supra note 27, at 9. The harm principle is well-stated in its most famous
elaboration:
[The fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to
observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. ... As such as any part of a person's
conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it....
20041
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
sanction preventing tobacco companies from harming smokers.
However, indirect paternalism is clearly distinguishable from the
harm principle. The harm principle sanctions interference with one
party, A, in order to protect another party, B, from unconsented harm.
Indirect paternalism, on the other hand, sanctions interference with
one party, A, to protect another party, B, from consented harm.1
35
Where the subject party (a smoker) consents to the harm (the
smoker substantially voluntarily purchased and smoked cigarettes),
then the other party's conduct (in manufacturing and selling
cigarettes) is not wrongful. So, the harm principle does not apply.
136
In other words, when the volenti (consent) maxim applies, the harm
principle cannot apply, but indirect paternalism can apply. To be
paternalistic, the agent must directly or indirectly interfere with the
subject's liberty.
b. Active and Passive Paternalism
To be paternalistic, the agent must limit the subject's liberty.
However, that interference need not be through prohibition.
Philosophers distinguish active and passive paternalism. 137 In active
paternalism, which some have described as promotive paternalism,
the agent limits the subject's liberty by demanding positive action
from the subject.'13 In requiring the subject to take affirmative action
(for example, forcing the subject to wear sunscreen), the agent seeks
to prevent the subject from encountering some otherwise unavoidable
harm (for example, skin cancer). On the other hand, in passive
paternalism, also known as protective paternalism, the agent limits
[I]f he has infringed the rules necessary for the protection of his fellow creatures,
individually or collectively, [t]he evil consequences of his act do not then fall on himself,
but on others; and society, as protector of all its members, must retaliate against him ....
ON LIBERTY, supra note 53, at 141.
135. See FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 8-9.
136. See, e.g., ON LIBERTY, supra note 53, at 157 (explaining that "the infringement complained of is
not on the liberty of the seller, but on that of the buyer and consumer").
137. E.g., ARMSDEN, supra note 27, at 13; BEAuCHAMP & CHiLDRESS, supra note 3, at 288;
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 8; KIEINIG, supra note 3, at 6, 14; KuLTGEN, supra note 3,
at 68; NIKU, supra note 3, at 45-46; UMEZO, supra note 74, at 6-7; Beauchamp, Mobehavioral Control,
supra note 51, at 65-66; Brock, Parentalism, supra note 3, at 541 (distinguishing protective and
promotive paternalism).
138. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 8; Brock, Parentalism, supra note 3, at 541.
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the subject's liberty by prohibiting the subject from engaging in some
conduct. 139 In requiring the subject to refrain from some conduct (for
example, smoking), the agent seeks to prevent the subject from
encountering some otherwise avoidable harm (for example, lung
cancer).
The distinction between "constraints," (that is, forcing one to do
what he does not want to do) and "restraints" (that is, preventing him
from doing what he does want to do) may capture the difference
between active and passive paternalism. 140 For a wide range of cases,
this is an accurate description. However, the distinction between
active and passive paternalism looks quite different when the agent
and the subject are in a fiduciary relationship and the subject expects
the agent to accede to the subject's requests. Then, even when the
agent does nothing (that is, imposing neither restraint nor constraint
on the subject), the relationship can be paternalistic.
Typically, we think of paternalism as when the paternalistic agent
refuses to accept a patient's request for nonintervention or
noninterference. That is, although the subject wishes to be left alone,
in spite of the subject's preferences, the agent intervenes.141 Childress
called this "active nonacquiescence."' 142 For example, a physician
might administer a blood transfusion to a Jehovah's Witness who
refused the procedure. Childress contrasted active nonacquiescence
with what he called "passive nonacquiescence."' 143 In passive
nonacquiescence, the paternalistic agent "refuses to carry out the
wishes or choices of a patient or to assist the patient in his or her
action. 144 For example, a physician might refuse the patient's
request for a particular treatment or procedure, believing it to be
medically futile.
The distinction between active and passive paternalism is unclear.
Hdyry explained that the boundaries between active and passive
paternalism in practice cannot be very distinct because the distinction
139. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 8; Brock, Parentalism, supra note 3, at 541.
140. See KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 158.
141. See CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 19.
142. Id. at 19, 115; Childress & Campbell, supra note 27, at 124.
143. CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 19; Childress & Campbell, supra note 27, at 124.
144. Childress & Campbell, supra note 27, at 124; see CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 19, 115.
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refers to "matters of degree rather than matters of clear-cut classes.
So, although the variety of possible reasons for paternalistic
intervention ought to be registered and recognized, it seems probable
that the finer details of the divisions will not be able to carry much
weight in justificatory considerations."'1
45
One reason for the lack of sharpness in the distinction between
active and passive paternalism is that an act of liberty limitation can
vary along the continuum of active to passive according to how the
subject's conduct is characterized. 146 For example, requiring
motorcyclists to wear helmets is arguably active paternalism because
it requires them to take affirmative steps to purchase and use special
equipment. Yet, perhaps this requirement is really passive
paternalism because it prevents riders from engaging in the arguably
discrete activity of helmetless motorcycle riding. 147 In any case, the
distinction between active and passive paternalism at least suggests
the range of interference that can satisfy the first condition of hard
paternalism.
c. Compulsive and Coercive Paternalism
To be paternalistic, the agent must limit the subject's liberty, but
the agent need not do so by force. Philosophers distinguish
"compulsive" and "coercive" paternalism.148  In compulsive
145. HAYRY, MEDICAL PATERNALISM, supra note 27, at 24 (emphasis added); see also CHILDRESS,
supra note 3, at 203.
146. E.g., FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 110, at 244 & n.13; FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra
note 18, at 123, 129, 132, 277, 282, 294, 30405; VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 6, 30; Carl Ginet, The
Individuation of Actions, in ON ACTION 45-71 (1990) (discussing key literature on individuation (citing
DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS (1980) and ALVIN 1. GOLDMAN, A THEORY OF
HUMAN ACTION (1970)); Gordon, supra note 41, at 268 ("[A]n action can often be referred to by
different descriptions ... ."); Sunstein, A Note, supra note 41, at 179; Weale, Invisible Hand, supra note
24, at 788 ("iThere is a certain indefiniteness about the identification of actions . .
147. Cf FEiNBERG, HARM TO OTrHERS, supra note 18, at 164, 259 n.48.
148. See, e.g., KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 68 ("[Justifiability is a function of the strength of the
subject's desires which they frustrate, the severity of the measures, and the magnitude of the goods and
harms produced.") (emphasis added); id. at 97 (discussing control of internal and external factors);
NIKKU, supra note 3, at 189; SCHONSHECK, supra note 28, at 150-51; VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 15;
David Archard, For Our Own Good, 72 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 283, 288-89 (1994); Edward
Sankowski, Paternalism and Social Policy, 22 AM. PHIL. Q. 1, 8-9 (1985) (offering eight sorts of
regulation). See generally Joel Feinberg, Coercion, in 2 ROurLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
387, 387-89 (Edward Craig ed., 1998). The distinction parallels that between the "libertarian paternalist"
(who insists on preserving choice) and the "non-libertarian paternalist" (who is willing to foreclose
choice). See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 60.
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paternalism, the agent forcibly limits the subject's freedom. 149 For
example, a physician might administer a blood transfusion to a
patient against her substantially voluntary expressed preferences. In
coercive paternalism, on the other hand, the agent intervenes with a
subject's liberty through threat or sanction.150 While compulsive
paternalism definitively closes the subject's chosen options, coercive
paternalism merely destroys the appeal of some options by making
them difficult, by making them inconvenient, or-to employ the
metaphor of a price tag-by increasing their cost. 151
Hobbes observed that "law is always a fetter."' 52 The degree to
which the law limits a subject's liberty falls on a continuum: it can be
more or less severe. 153 The agent can limit options by imposing low
or high costs. Moreover, a significant difference seems to exist
between, for example, the use of physical force by the police and the
mere promulgation of a statute.
Laws themselves are not compulsive. 154 Jonathan Schonsheck
explained that "[t]he enactment of a criminal law does not, strictly
speaking, 'prevent' people from electing the proscribed activity."'
155
The law typically affects only one's liberty and not one's freedom.
156
Gray contended that "a legal impediment ... does not render an agent
unfree, since she can (physically) perform the illegal act, and take the
consequences."'157 Rather, Gray argued, "laws... leave the agent free
149. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 190. See, e.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 60
(illustrating the point with the example of designing the placement of food in a cafeteria line: "Putting
the fruit before the desserts is a fairly mild intervention. A more intrusive step would be to place the
desserts in another location altogether, so that diners have to get up and get a dessert after they have
finished the rest of their meal").
150. FEINBERG, HARMTO SELF, supra note 18, at 191.
151. Id at 191-92.
152. THoMAs HOBBES, LEvIATHAN ch. XIV (Penguin ed., 1968) (1647).
153. See, e.g., FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 18, at 24; Chan, supra note 24, at 86; N.
Fotion, Paternalism, 89 ETHIcs 191, 194-95 (1979); Hayry, Paternalism, supra note 38, at 456
(describing one kind of hard paternalism: "maternalism," where the agent uses emotional blackmail);
Lee, supra note 127, at 193-94; Allison D. Murdach, Beneficence Re-examined: Protective Intervention
in Mental Health, 41 Soc. WORK 26, 27 (1996).
154. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
155. SCHONSHECK, supra note 28, at 9; see also HAYRY, MEDICAL PATERNALISM, supra note 27, at
41-42; Husak, Liberal Neutrality, supra note 27, at 69; LaMond, supra note 66; Steiner, supra note 66,
at 36.
156. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 18, at 8-9, 246 n.4; FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra
note 18, at 62-65; Feinberg, Freedom, supra note 63, at 753; Harris, Adult Behavior, supra note 24, at
581.
157. GRAY, supra note 67, at 23.
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in another respect-to yield or not yield to the sanction."'1 58
Furthermore, one who violates the law only suffers a penalty if
authorities catch her, and even then the penalty (for example, for
smoking) is typically a mere fine.1
59
In contrast to coercive interventions such as laws, compulsive
interventions more acutely limit liberty.' 60 For example, if a doctor
administers a blood transfusion to a patient against her will, perhaps
while she is unconscious, she cannot do anything about it. The doctor
has physically restricted her freedom de facto. 16 1 This seems more
severe than a mere de jure restriction of liberty which structures
incentives or sets the "costs" of some conduct.
162
Nevertheless, the distinction between coercive and compulsive
interventions is not very sharp in practice. While laws themselves are
not compulsive, their application certainly can be compulsive. The
difference between law-as-such and law-as-applied roughly tracks the
difference between law-as-passed by a legislature and law-as-
enforced by police or other enforcement agents. 163  Law in both
senses affects individual liberty, but law in the latter sense also
affects freedom. An individual can choose to disregard her legal duty
158. Id. at26.
159. Cf FEINBERG, HARMLESs WRONGDIXNG, supra note 6, at 289 n.2. Sunstein and Thaler overstate
the point in writing that "[I]ibertarian paternalism is a relatively weak and nonintnzsive type of
paternalism, because choices are not blocked or fenced off." Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 60. The fact
that, for example, severely coercive laws leave options (technically) open hardly seems sufficient to
make the paternalism nonintrusive. Admittedly, Sunstein and Thaler largely paint their libertarian
paternalist as one who will ensure that people can easily avoid the patemalist's option. Id. However, the
position also includes the paternalist who is willing to impose real costs. Id. Furthermore, some laws
affect the market to such a degree that the option is effectively removed from consumers. For example,
outlawing the smoking (as opposed to the manufacturing) of tobacco leaves individuals with the freedom
to smoke. But the incentive provided by the law might diminish consumption such that the tobacco
companies would go out of business. Then, there would be no cigarettes to smoke, even if one were
willing to take the risk of apprehension and punishment.
160. Interestingly, the emphasis of the distinction between dejure and de facto limitations of liberty is
the essence of the typical defense of Mill's prohibition of slavery contracts. John Kleinig, for example,
argued that this prohibition is not inconsistent with Mill's anti-paternalistic stance: "Mill is not
advocating interference with self-enslavement as such, but only opposing the contractualization of such
arrangements." KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 158; see also FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 71.
161. Cf NIKKU, supra note 3, at46.
162. GRAY, supra note 67, at 26 ("[1]t is not the issuing of the threat that prevents a person from
doing what she was previously able to do, but the carrying out of that threat."); TREBILCOCK, supra note
96, at 6. But see Weale, Paternalism, supra note 18, at 160 (arguing that legal sanctions are more
coercive). See generally ARMSDEN, supra note 27, at 30; Feinberg, Freedom, supra note 63, at 753
(comparing liberty and freedom).
163. Cf KLEDO, supra note 3, at 11; KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 161-62.
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to drive within the posted speed limits, but once the police handcuff
her or lock her in a jail cell, she cannot drive at all. 164 In any case, the
distinction between compulsive and coercive paternalism at least
suggests the range of interference that can satisfy the first condition
of hard paternalism.
d. Contemporaneous, Retrospective, and Prospective
Paternalism
To be paternalistic, the agent must limit the subject's liberty.
However, the agent's interference can share different temporal
relationships with the subject's conduct. First, in "contemporaneous
paternalism," the agent restricts the subject from doing something
that she was preparing to do immediately. For example, a police
officer might physically restrain an individual from bungee jumping
off a bridge. Second, in "prospective paternalism," the agent restricts
the subject from doing something in the future. For example, the state
legislature might promulgate a statute which requires that, effective
January 1, 2005, motorcycle riders wear crash helmets. Third, in
"retrospective paternalism," the agent restricts the subject's liberty by
releasing her from the consequences of the poor choices to which she
previously consented. For example, a court might not enforce a valid
164. Cf. Zamir, supra note 3, at 261 n.80, 281. The difference between these two senses of law, as
promulgated and as applied, is relevant in another way. A legislature might promulgate a law for non-
paternalistic reasons. State agents might, nevertheless, enforce the law in a paternalistic manner.
Conversely, the legislature might promulgate a paternalistic law. State agents might, nevertheless,
enforce the law in a non-paternalistic manner. This Article focuses on legislation and the authorization
of liberty restriction, rather than on implementation of that authority. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP, MORAL
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 421; BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 10; ALLEN E.
BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURRoGATE DECISION MAKING
7 (1989); DANIEL CALLAHAN, FALSE HOPES: WHY AMERICA'S QUEST FOR PERFECT HEALTH IS A
RECIPE FOR FAILURE 197 (1998); FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 18, at 4, 10, 16; FEINBERG,
HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at ix, 25; FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 6, at 30,258,
321, 323; id at 66 (distinguishing moral legitimization and justifying reasons on balance); NEW ETHICS
FOR THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH 7 (Dan E. Beauchamp & Bonnie Steinbock eds., 1999); RILEY, supra note
51, at 114-15, 191; SCHONSHECK, supra note 28, at 67; Joel Feinberg, HARM TO OTHERs-A Rejoinder, 5
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 16, 16-17 (1986); Harris, Adult Behavior, supra note 24, at 588; Regan, supra note
78, at 114 ("My hypothetical paternalist does not make mistakes .... I am ignoring serious practical
problems, because it seems to me that before we can decide what sorts of paternalism are justified in
practice, we need to have some idea of what sorts would be justified for my ideal paternalist.").
20041
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
contract or might allow a party to recover in tort for injuries which
she voluntarily assumed. 1
65
e. Summary of Condition One
The agent's limitation of the subject's liberty is a necessary
condition of hard paternalism because hard paternalism is, after all, a
liberty-limiting principle. The concept of hard paternalism involves
an agent's limitation of a subject's liberty under certain
circumstances and for particular reasons. So, even before specifying
these circumstances and reasons, a necessary condition of hard
paternalism is that liberty limitation must be present in the first
place. 1
66
2. Condition Two: The Agent Must Limit the Subject's Liberty
Primarily Out of Benevolence Toward the Subject
The second condition of hard paternalism is perhaps its most
distinctive. All liberty-limiting principles are ethical bases for
limiting the subject's liberty. What distinguishes them from each
other is the agent's motive in restricting the subject's liberty.
Professor Daniel Thompson correctly explained that "paternalism
refers not to a distinct class of actions but [refers instead] to a class of
reasons that we may use to justify or condemn restrictions."'167 What
kind of reasons for liberty limitation are hard paternalistic?
165. See, e.g., DWORKIN, AUTONOMY, supra note 37, at 109; HART, supra note 105, at 31; KLEINIG,
supra note 3, at 188; KULTOEN, supra note 3, at 166; PROSSER, supra note 6, at 101; Smiley, supra note
109, at313.
166. Distinctions between (1) direct and indirect; (2) active and passive; (3) compulsive and coercive;
and (4) contemporaneous, retrospective, and prospective paternalism all permit philosophers to describe
the manner of liberty limitation more precisely. These distinctions represent only contingent, and not
necessary, features of hard paternalism.
167. THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 153; Thompson, supra note 47, at 249; see also FEINBERG, HARM
TO SELF, supra note 18, at 22; GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 235; HUSAK, DRUGS AND
RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 64 ("The distinction between harm to oneself and harm to others.., is a
distinction between rationales for laws."); KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 12 ("What is important so far as
paternalism is concerned is not whether it is possible to isolate a class of 'paternalistic' impositions, but
whether a particular (e.g., paternalistic) rationale for imposing upon others has any moral standing, and
if so, how much.'); id at 14; id. at 18 ("Unless something like this [distinction] is assumed, the whole
issue of paternalism is rendered academic."); id at 16 ("Mhe harm principle is not concerned with harm
merely in the sense of damage. It is concerned with harm as an injury, a wrong."); id at 33-36
(suggesting that even this definition might not be sufficient and it might be better to focus on the
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To be properly described as "paternalistic," an agent's motive for
restricting a subject's liberty must be subject-focused. Specifically, it
must be benevolent toward the subject. As Dworkin explained, "P
acts paternalistically toward Q if and only if... P acts with the intent
of averting some harm or promoting some benefit for Q.,,1
68
VanDeVeer similarly explained, "[I]f A acts paternalistically he does
so with an altruistic motive; he aims at promoting the good of
another." 1
69
A necessary condition of paternalism is that the paternalistic agent
limit the subject's liberty with the primary motive either to confer a
benefit upon or to avert harm from the subject. 170  This motive
motivation for restriction rather than the conduct restricted); NiKKu, supra note 3, at 122-24;
SCHONSHECK, supra note 28, at 109 ("Strictly speaking . . . 'paternalistic' is a predicate of
justfications."); Douglas M. Husak, Legal Paternalism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL ETHICS
387-412 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2003) [hereinafter Husak, Legal Paternalism]; Robert Marples, Review of
JoHN KLENiG, PAFERNAUSM, 2 J. APPLIED PHIL. 288,288 (1985) ("[P]atemalism is seen as a rationale
for acting rather than as a form of behaviour."); Moore, supra note 24, at 72; id at 76 (noting that what
is distinctive about paternalism lies "not so much in the content of recommended restrictions or
legislation, but in the form of the argument for those restrictions") (emphasis added); Perri 6, sqpra note
18, at 160 ("[Platemalism is a category of reason for action, not an empirically observable discrete
natural kind of action.").
168. Dworkin, Paternalism--CAMBRIDGE, supra note 113, at 649; see also Dworkin, Paternalism-
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 44, at 940 ("[lts purported justification would be in terms of reasons
referring to the promotion of the person's good or the prevention of harm to the person."); Dworkin,
Paternalism-ETHIcs, supra note 113, at 1282.
169. VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 12.
170. See, e.g., ARMSDEN, supra note 27, at 21, 124; BAYLES, supra note 127, at 119-20; BEAUCHAMP
& CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 274,417; Beauchamp & McCullough, supra note 51, at 84; CnwREss,
supra note 3, at 12-13; FEINBERo, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 4-7 (comparing benevolent and non-
benevolent paternalism and considering only the former as true paternalism); id at 377 n.23; GERT ET
AL., supra note 79, at 197; KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 10; ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 254 (1979); KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 62-63, 67, 72,
173, 212; ON LIBERTY, supra note 53, at 170-71 (arguing that taxing hazardous products is acceptable in
order to raise revenue but unacceptable with the objective to discourage their use); NIKKu, supra note 3,
at 45, 155; THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 151; VANDEVEEiR, supra note 6, at 22, 24 (noting that Hart
lacks this element); id at 28, 56, 306, 423; David Archard, Paternalism Defined, 50 ANALYsIS 36, 36,
38-39 (1990); Arnson, Mill Versus, supra note 41, at 471-72; Arneson, Paternalism, supra note 113, at
250 ("The paradigm of paternalism ... is restriction of people's liberty... for their own good.");
Beauchamp, Paternalism, supra note 38, at 1914-15; Beauchamp, Biobehavloral Control, supra note 51,
at 123; Buchanan, supra note 79, at 372; Carter, supra note 58, at 133; Chan, supra note 24, at 86;
Clarke, supra note 112, at 82-83; Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice:
An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 121 n.287 (1999);
Norman 0. Dahl, Review Essay-Against Legal Paternalism, 7 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 67, 69 (1988);
Dworkin, Paernaism-ENCYCOPEDIA, supra note 44, at 940; Fotion, supra note 153, at 197; Hershey,
supra note 127, at 172; Nancy S. Jecker, Is Refusal of Futile Treatment Unjustified Paternalism?, 6 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 133, 134 (1995); Kasachkoff, supra note 24, at 412; Kennedy, supra note 5, at 570-
71; Perri 6, supra note 18, at 160; Shapiro, supra note 4, at 522, 525; Shiffrin, supra note 75, at 218
("[Platemalism by A toward B may be characterized as behavior ... directed at B's own interests...
."); C.L. Ten, Paternalism and Morality, 13 RATIO 56, 64 (1971); Weale, Paternalism, supra note 18, at
163; id. at 168 ("[N]o policy instrument or process can be labelled paternalist irrespective of the policy
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condition allows us to distinguish the benevolent despot, who seeks
the good of the subject (albeit according to his own conception of the
good) from the tyrant, who is in no way concerned with the subject's
good (and just wants to impose his will).' 7
a. Benevolence Versus Beneficence
Explaining the benevolent motive condition with a bit more
specificity may be helpful. In particular, distinguishing
"benevolence," which is essential, from "beneficence," which is not
essential, is important. 172 Although some commentators often portray
paternalism as an application of the principle of beneficence at the
expense of the principle of autonomy, 173 paternalism is, in fact,
neither necessarily nor intrinsically beneficent.
aims it is meant to achieve."); Weale, Invisible Hand, supra note 24, at 790. To the extent the agent's
motive is not wholly to benefit the subject, the paternalism is "mixed." FENBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra
note 18, at 8. While the agent's motive to benefit the subject may not be the agent's only motive for
intervening, it is necessary and sufficient. Other motives are accidental.
171. Cf ARMSDEN, supra note 27, at 143. James Childress noted that "[o]ne common argument
against paternalistic practices is that their alleged benevolence or beneficence really masks self-interest."
CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 43. Indeed, it is useful to observe that people have often employed and
continue to employ paternalistic rationales to justify gender, racial, and other invidious discrimination.
See KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 78, 171; Douglas, supra note 85, at 197-98; Weiss, supra note 18, at 186
('Paternalism, in which a patient's freedom is lessened for the patient's ultimate benefit, should not be
confused with authoritarianism, where this freedom is lessened for the physician's power."); Zamir,
supra note 3, at 281. For gender discrimination, see Fronero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-91
(1973) (striking on Fifth Amendment due process grounds a military regulation that presumed
dependency for female spouses but not for male spouses for benefits purposes) (citing Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (upholding a state law refusing to grant women, for their
own.good, the license to practice law)); id at 684-85 ("Traditionally, [discrimination against women]
was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a
pedestal, but in a cage."). For racial discrimination, see Anita L. Allen & Thaddeus Pope, Social
Contract Theory Slavery, and the Antebelhan Courts, in A BLACKWELL COMPANION TO AFRICAN
AMEUCAN PHILOsoPHY 125 (Tommy L. Lott & John P. Pittman eds., 2003) and KLEINIG, supra note 3,
at 171. For disability discrimination, see Harlan Hahn, Paternalism and Public Policy, 20 SOcIETY 36
(1983) and Mike Jackman, Enabling the Disabled: Paternalism Is Enemy No., 15 PERSPECTIVES 22, 22
(1983). Nevertheless, this usage is not an indictment of paternalism because tyrannical, agent-self-
interested liberty-limitation, in spite of the rhetoric it may employ, is not really paternalism.
172. Here, I use these terms in their standard etymological sense rather than in the technical
jargonistic sense they have in normative ethics. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
144 (1986).
173. See, e.g., Beauchamp, Paternalism, supra note 38, at 1914 ("[A]n act of paternalism overrides
the value of respect for autonomy on some grounds of beneficence."); CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, supra
note 30, at 33 ("The essence of paternalism is an overriding of the principle of respect for autonomy on
grounds of the principle of beneficence."); FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 58 (noting that
although conceptually related, the subject's good is conceptually distinct from the subject's right of self-
determination); FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOINo, supra note 6, at xvii ("Legal paternalism...
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The paternalistic agent need not actually do (facere) good (bene)
for the subject. The definition of paternalism does not require that the
paternalistic agent be successful in achieving good for the subject.
174
Paul Turner Hershey explained:
While it seems correct to say that a necessary condition for the
definition of paternalism is that such acts are taken for the
recipient's own good, it seems incorrect to say that such actions
are paternalistic only if they succeed in being for the recipient's
own good. One needs to temper such a necessary condition with
the fact that not all paternalistic actions produce the good for
which they are intended. We might instead only require that
paternalistic actions are intended to benefit their recipients.
Allowances can then be made for failing to benefit the recipient
while still being able to say that such actions are paternalistic.1
75
For example, I might try to thwart a subject's suicide attempt by
shoving that person out of the way of an oncoming truck. Despite my
efforts, the truck might still strike and kill the suicidal individual.
This would be unsuccessful paternalism, but it is paternalism
nonetheless because I interfered with another's liberty for her own
good.
176
Furthermore, success is not a sufficient condition of paternalism
either. It is not enough that the consequences of the intervention
happen to, coincidentally or unintentionally, confer a benefit onto the
subordinates a person's right of self-determination to the person's own good."); KLEINIG, supra note 3,
at 5; Childress & Campbell, supra note 27, at 122.
174. See, e.g., CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 21; KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 76; Archard, supra note 170,
at 37; Chan, supra note 24, at 86 ("mhe intention to benefit the subject, and not the success in doing so,
defines paternalism."); Hershey, supra note 127, at 172.
175. Hershey, supra note 127, at 172.
176. E.g., CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 21; Hershey, supra note 127, at 177. If the agent's limitation is
not reasonably calculated to be effective in achieving good for the subject, then the agent's paternalism
may be a pretext for another perhaps less palatable motive for intervention. Alternatively, the
ineffectiveness may have an impact on the justifiability of hard paternalism. Limiting individual liberty
is unacceptable when doing so fails to produce any good. Effectiveness does not factor into the
definition of paternalism. The implementation of any liberty limiting principle may fail to achieve the
principle's core aim (for example, prevent harm to others). Hard paternalism, like all liberty limiting
principles, takes an ex ante rather than an ex post perspective on the agent's liberty limitation.
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subject. 177 If I restrict your liberty either for my own selfish reasons
or for other-regarding reasons and without any altruistic motive, but
it nevertheless turns out that (accidentally) you benefit, that
accidental result does not make my intervention paternalistic.'
78
Notwithstanding the actual results of my intervention, I did not
intervene with your liberty with the motive of protecting or benefiting
you. 
79
Although paternalism is not necessarily beneficent, it is, on the
other hand, necessarily benevolent. The paternalistic agent must have
the will (volens) to promote the good (bene) of the subject. If an
agent's motive for restricting a subject's liberty were selfish,
moralistic, or for some other motive that does not involve benefiting
the subject or saving the subject from harm, then the agent's
restriction of the subject's liberty would not be paternalism.
80
Liberty limitation must be for the subject's good and not for the
general good. Otherwise, the liberty limitation would fall under
another liberty-limiting principle or, if selfishly motivated, would fall
under no liberty-limiting principle.'1
8
177. See, e.g., FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 21; KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 38; Husak,
Legal Paternalism, supra note 167.
178. VanDeVeer criticized Hart's definition, "the protection of people against themselves," for being
deficient because it suggests that successful protection is sufficient VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 24.
VanDeVeer suggested the counterexample where an enraged husband punches out his wife and thereby
unwittingly prevents her from taking cyanide pills. Id The husband "protected" his wife, but he did not
act pate alistically.
179. See, e.g., FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 17-18; Weale, Invisible Hand, supra note
24, at 790.
180. See, e.g., FE3NBERo, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 4-7 (comparing benevolent and
nonbenevolent paternalism and considering only the former as paternalism); KULTGEN, supra note 3, at
55 ("Conflictful parentalism is actually pseudo-parentalism since genuine parentalism entails the
intention to benefit the subject, but here it is only pretended."); id at 200; Chan, supra note 24, at 89, 90
n.13 (arguing that if agents "interfere on the ground of interwoven interests, they do not interfere qua
paternalists, for then they are interfering for the sake of their own interests rather than ours. An act is
paternalistic only if the subject's interest is the reason for which the act is done, rather than the agent's
own interest."); Zamir, supra note 3, at 281 (describing the case where the agent's "benevolent rhetoric
may disguise other, less legitimate motivations" as "false paternalism").
181. "Paternalistic interventions contrast with state limitations on individual action that are based on
other concerns (for example, the rights of others or public health and safety)." Jessica Wilen Berg,
Understanding Waiver, 40 Hous. L. REv. 281, 293 n.55 (2003). Other liberty limiting principles
include: (1) the harm principle, (2) the offense principle, and (3) moralism. See generally BEAUCHAMP,
MORAL PmiLOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 352-73; FENBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 6, at
xix-xx.
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b. Mixed Versus Unmixed Paternalism
While a paternalistic liberty limitation requires a benevolent
motive, determining the presence of this motive is often difficult
because much liberty limitation is motivated by several reasons at
once. 182 Philosophers refer to this as "mixed paternalism."' 183 In
mixed paternalism, the agent intervenes on the basis of not only
paternalism but also on the basis of some other liberty-limiting
principle. For example, the paternalistic agent might restrict the
subject's liberty with the intention of providing a benefit to or
averting harm from not only the subject but also to and from
others.1 84  In "unmixed paternalism," on the other hand, the
paternalistic agent restricts a subject's liberty either in order to
protect only the subject from harm or in order to provide a benefit to
only the subject herself. 185
The distinction between mixed and unmixed paternalism is, in one
respect, the flipside of the distinction between direct and indirect
paternalism regarding the effect of the agent's intervention. In mixed
paternalism, the agent restricts the subject's liberty with the motive of
benefiting not only the subject but also others. In unmixed
paternalism, the agent restricts the subject's liberty with the motive of
benefiting only the subject. The following two diagrams illustrate the
relationship between the "mixedness" of paternalism and the
directness of paternalism.
182. See, e.g., BEAUcHAMP & CHiLDREss, supra note 3, at 179.
183. E.g., FENBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 8, 16.
184. CGET ET AL., supra note 79, at 197; Nmuu,, supra note 3, at 33, 45, 120; Hershey, supra note
127, at 172; Shapiro, supra note 4, at 526 n.2I (noting that distributive policies like food stamps may
have paternalistic aspects).
185. FEINBER, HARM TO SEFw, supra note 18, at 8, 16-21; KULTOEN, supra note 3, at 79; see also,
e.g., BEAucHAwP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 275; Shapiro, supra note 4, at 526-27.
2004]




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Who is Restricted A B A B
For Whose Benefit A A AB AB
Four possible combinations exist.18 6 The first combination, (1)
unmixed-direct, is the sort of paternalistic intervention addressed in
this Article. 8 7 This is the restriction of only A's liberty with the
primary objective of benefiting only A. For example, a helmet law
restricts the liberty of only motorcyclists (A) with the primary
objective of benefiting the riders (A) themselves.'
88
The second combination, (2) unmixed-indirect, is the restriction of
the liberty of B with the primary intent of benefiting only A. For
example, regulation of the tobacco industry restricts the liberty of
cigarette companies (B) with the primary objective of benefiting
individual smokers (A).189
The third combination, (3) mixed-direct, is the restriction of only
A's liberty with the primary objective of benefiting not only A but
also B. For example, restricting a smoker (A) will help not only the
smoker (A) but also those exposed to her environmental tobacco
smoke (B). 190
186. Kultgen suggested that these distinctions generate only three cells, denying the possibility of
direct-mixed paternalism. See KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 165-66. However, as I argue below, surely
situations exist where a paternalistic agent can directly restrict a subject for her own good and, to a
lesser degree, also for the good of others.
187. See discussion supra.
188. See KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 166-67.
189. Id. at 166.
190. Id.
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The fourth combination, (4) mixed-indirect, is the restriction of the
liberty of B with the primary objective of benefiting not only A but
also B. For example, licensure requirements impose restrictions on
professionals (B) but benefit both professionals (B) economically and
their customers (A) by ensuring quality.
191
c. Pure Versus Impure Paternalism
It is helpful to distinguish "mixed" and "unmixed" paternalism,
which refers to the purity of the agent's motive, and "direct" and
"indirect" paternalism, which refers to whose liberty is restricted,
from "pure" and "impure" paternalism, which refers to the purity of
the consequences of the agent's intervention.
192
In pure paternalism, the agent primarily benefits only those
subjects whose liberty the agent limits. For example, a law requiring
hunters to wear bright orange jackets protects only the hunters
themselves. 193 If an unmarried, childless hunter neglects to wear his
orange jacket, and his fellow hunters subsequently mistake him for a
deer and shoot him, then only the jacketless hunter will suffer.
In impure paternalism, on the other hand, the consequence of an
agent's restriction of the subject's liberty has spillover effects onto
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., ARMSDEN, supra note 27, at 10; Dworkin, Paternalism-MORALrrY, supra note 6, at
108, 110-1 1; KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 12; UMEzo, supra note 74, at 26; VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at
28, 66; see also FEINBERG, HARMLSS WRONoDOING, supra note 6, at 8-9 (using the terms "impure"
and "pure" to indicate when moralistic justifications do and do not also appeal to the harm principle).
This builds on my distinction between benevolence and beneficence.
193. The plausibility of pure paternalism precisely correlates to the plausibility of the notion of self-
regarding conduct. Cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 1999) (comparing four
examples of self-regarding and four examples of other-regarding restrictions in Texas law); FEINBERO,
HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 22 ("We can assume ... a line can be drawn ... between other-
regarding behavior and conduct that is primarily and directly self-regarding and only indirectly and
remotely, therefore trivially, other-regarding."); VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 433-34; Bayles, supra
note 85, at 109 n.3 ("Feinberg deftly handles the much-discussed question of whether there is any purely
self-regarding conduct. He admits that conduct in which persons harm themselves always involves the
public interest at least to a slight extent, but often not enough to invoke the harm to others principle.").
At some point, harm-to-others justifications become so tenuous that characterizing the paternalism as
pure is appropriate. See FEINERO, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 22 (admitting that conduct in which
persons harm themselves always involves the public interest to some extent but often not enough to
invoke the harm principle); see also id at 56 ("As John Stuart Mill pointed out, however, a rough and
serviceable distinction... can be drawn between decisions that are plainly other-regarding... and those
that are 'directly,' 'chiefly,' or 'primarily' self-regarding. There will be a twilight area of cases that are
difficult to classify, but that is true of many other workable distinctions, including that between night
and day.").
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third parties. 194 For example, a law banning the smoking of tobacco
would protect the health not only of smokers but also the health of
others, under most circumstances, because of reduced environmental
tobacco smoke. With impure paternalism, the benefited class of
liberty-restricted persons whose good is involved is not identical with
the class of persons whose liberty is restricted. Specifically, the
former class, those benefited, is typically wider than the latter class,
those restricted, because the restricted individuals posed harm not
only to themselves but also to others.
The following four-cell diagram represents the relation between





194. Very impure measures, such as the provision of clean water, are often more effective at
achieving public health objectives than education or coercion. See generally NIKKU, supra note 3, at
203-05; Tom Christoffel, The Role of Law in Reducing Injury, 17 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 7, 9
(1989). The more impure the interference, the more it is appropriately characterized as a limitation of
freedom rather than as a limitation of liberty. In such circumstances, individuals' existing options are
unlimited but the very array of available options is restructured. See generally FEINBERO, HARMLESS
WRONGDOING, supra note 6, at 290-91; VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 317 ("[G]ovements . . .
determine a broad range of options."); id at 336. Governments regularly restructure available options by
providing spending or incentives. See FADEN & BEAuCHAMP, supra note 110, at 355 ("environmental
manipulation"); KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 107; NANCY MILIO, PROMOTING HEALTH THROUGH PUBLIC
POLICY 73-76 (1981); PRINCIPLES OF PoLITIcAL ECONOMY, supra note 21, at 956 ("There are matters in
which the interference of law is required, not to overrule the judgment of individuals respecting their
own interests, but to give effect to that judgment; they being unable to give effect to it except by concert,
which concert again cannot be effectual unless it receives validity and sanction from the law."); id at
803 ("There is a multitude of cases in which the government, with the general approbation, assumes
powers and executes functions for... general convenience... paving, lighting, and cleansing the streets
... ."); Fotion, supra note 153, at 197; William C. Powers, Jr., Autonomy and the Legal Control of Self-
Regarding Conduct, 51 WASH. L. REV. 33, 42-43 (1975) ("In these situations, the ability to choose
autonomously one's own lifestyle cannot be exercised by individuals: rather it must be exercised by
communities of individuals."); Shapiro, supra note 4, at 547-48 (describing measures "not designed to
help some people in spite of themselves, but to help realize a particular objective"); Cass R. Sunstein,
Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 522 (2000) ("[llnsofar as the argument stresses
a collective action problem faced by individual consumers, paternalism is not at work at all.").
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Cells (1) and (4) are uncomplicated. Cell (1) represents the case in
which an agent limits a subject's liberty to benefit only that subject
and through the intervention, in fact, benefits only that subject. Cell
(4) represents the case in which an agent limits a subject's liberty for
the good of both the subject and also of others and through the
intervention, in fact, benefits both the subject and others.
195
Cells (2) and (3) are more complicated. They illustrate the
importance of drawing a distinction between purity of motive, mixed
or unmixed, and purity of consequences, pure or impure. Cell (2),
unmixed motive, impure consequences, represents the case in which
an agent limits a subject's liberty with the intention to benefit only
that subject but, nevertheless, coincidentally benefits third parties.
For example, one might stop another from experimenting with
controlled substances for that other's own good. In actuality, the
liberty restriction also prevents harm to neighbors that the same
hazardous fumes would have caused without the intervention. This
intervention would be pure in motive but impure in result and is
described as "unmixed impure direct paternalism."
Cell (3), impure motive, pure consequences, represents the case in
which an agent limits a subject's liberty with an impure motive but,
nevertheless, produces a purely paternalistic result. For example, one
might stop a subject from smoking both in order to protect that
subject from mainstream smoke and in order to protect the subject's
family from secondary smoke. In actuality, the subject smokes only
on his outside deck, where the environmental tobacco smoke
dissipates to safe concentrations. Thus, the intervention will not help
the subject's family as intended; it will help only the smoker. This
intervention would be impure in motive but pure in result and is
described as "mixed pure direct paternalism."
While one can draw and assess the distinction between pure and
impure paternalism, regarding effects and consequences,
195. Of course, the agent's primary or sole motive in intervening might be to prevent harm to others
or to preserve either morality in general or the morality of the subject. These considerations, however,
should be secondary. Otherwise, the paternalism will be too impure and other liberty-limiting principles
could independently justify the liberty restriction. In other words, if the subject's welfare is too small a
motivating factor, relative to either the welfare of others or to the agent's own interests, then the liberty
limitation might not be impure paternalism but might not be paternalism at all.
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independently from the distinction between mixed and unmixed
paternalism, regarding the agent's motives, these two notions are
interdependent in one sense. 196 When the purity of the intervention is
very high or very low, imputing, respectively, a mixed or unmixed
motive to the paternalistic agent will rarely be plausible. If too
impure, the intervention will not meet the necessary condition of hard
paternalism-that the agent interfered with the subject's liberty
primarily out of benevolence toward the subject. 197  Sufficient
evidence must exist for the agent to believe that limiting the subject's
liberty will benefit the subject. 198
d. Summary of Condition Two
In sum, the second condition of hard paternalism requires that the
primary motive of the liberty-limiting agent in limiting the subject's
liberty be benevolence toward the subject. Were the agent's motive
benevolent toward someone other than the subject or were it not
benevolent at all, the agent's limitation of the subject's liberty would
not be hard paternalism.
3. Condition Three: The Agent Must Disregard the Subject's
Contemporaneous Preferences
The third condition of hard paternalism requires that the agent's
motive for intervention be independent from and without regard to
the subject's contemporaneous preferences. 199 Dworkin explained
196. Cf FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 8.
197. See supra Part III.B.2.
198. See supra Part 1ll.B.2.
199. See, e.g., ARMSDEN, supra note 27, at 7; BAYLES, supra note 127, at 119-20; FEINBERG, HARM
TO SELF, supra note 18, at 20-21; GERT ET AL., supra note 79, at 198, 203; HAYRY, MEDICAL
PATERNALISM, supra note 27, at 54, 139 (giving the "concept of an intervention a rather wide
interpretation"); KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 62-63, 212 (criticizing VanDeVer's requirement that the
intervention be contray to the subject's preference, and also criticizing Get and Culver's requirement
that the actor believe he is violating a moral rule); NIKKu, supra note 3, at 55; VANDEVEER, supra note
6, at 18-20, 22 (expanding the definition of the condition to include intervention such as indoctrination
to mold the creation of the preferences); Archard, supra note 170, at 36, 39 ("[S]ince [the agent] thinks
that [the subject] shares [the agent's] judgement of [the subject's] good,... the behavior does not count
as paternalist."); id at 39-40 (requiring, wrongly, a denial or diminishment of choice or opportunity);
Arneson, Paternalism, supra note 113, at 250 ("The paradigm of paternalism... is restriction of
people's liberty against their will ... ."); Beauchamp, Paternalism, supra note 38, at 1914; Douglas,
supra note 85, at 172; Dworkin, Paternalism-ENYCLPEDIA, supra note 44, at 940; Hayry,
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that "P acts paternalistically toward Q if and only if . P acts
contrary to (or is indifferent to) the current preferences, desires, or
values of Q., 200 Childress explained that the paternalistic agent acts
on the subject's behalf but not at the subject's behest.
20 1
The need to distinguish hard paternalism from cases of gift-giving,
philanthropy, charity, and general altruism requires this condition.
20 2
No one would consider it hard paternalism for an agent to limit the
liberty of a subject at the subject's request. It was not hard
paternalism, for example, for Odysseus' crew to bind him to the mast.
They were merely following Odysseus' orders.
20 3
If the subject wants the agent to intervene and if the agent
intervenes because the subject wants her to intervene, then the
agent's intervention is not paternalistic. If the agent's intervention is
neither contrary to nor independent of the subject's contemporaneous
preferences, then the agent's intervention is altruism rather than
paternalism.
20 4
The subject's consent to intervention itself does not make the
agent's liberty limitation non-paternalistic. 20 5 The subject's consent
Paternalism, supra note 38, at 451 ("[A]ctions are paternalistic when those in positions of authority...
refuse to act according to people's wishes.. . ."); Hershey, supra note 127, at 178 ("This independence
in A's decision to act characterizes B's consent or dissent as irrelevant or motivationally impotent."); id
at 179 (explaining that liberty limitation is paternalistic only if the subject's consent is not a relevant
consideration for the agent); New, supra note 19, at 65 n.2 (suggesting that this condition is met
automatically with state paternalism because there is no individualized assessment of preferences or
consent); Shapiro, supra note 4, at 523-24; Peter Suber, Paternalism, in 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 632, 632 (Christopher Berry Gray ed., 1999) ("'Paternalism' . . . is to act for the good of
another person without that person's consent....").
200. Dworkin, Paternalism--CARIDGE, supra note 113, at 649.
201. CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at4.
202. See Hershey, supra note 127, at 177.
203. TNE ODYSSEY of HOMER Book XII, 189 (Richmond Lattimore trans., Harper & Row ed., 1967).
204. See Raymond B. Marcin, Review of PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS OF
BENEVOLENCE, 41 REV. METAPHYSICS 637,639 (1988).
205. Serious conceptual incoherencies arise from using consent as the basis to justify paternalistic
intervention. The agent cannot have his cake and eat it too. The more the agent draws on the justificatory
force of consent, the less the intervention is a paternalistic one. See generally ARMSDEN, supra note 27,
at 81, 114-48; BEAUCHAMp & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 129 (calling consent arguments "misleading
and dangerous"); FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 182-83 (subsequent consent); HAYRY,
MEDICAL PATERNALISM, supra note 27, at 118-19 (same); HODSON, supra note 51, at 63; KLEINIG,
supra note 3, at 66; id. at 61-63 (charging subsequent consent arguments with ad-hocery); KULTGEN,
supra note 3, at 119-21, 123, 139, 224 (arguing that consent arguments "could be extended to almost
any intervention by the enthusiastic parentalist" and that they go down the "road of implausibility");
NIKKU, supra note 3, at 81-88, 110 (subsequent consent); VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 66-70 (same);
David Archard, Self-Justifying Paternalism, 27 J. VALuE INQUIRY 341, 342 (1993); Beauchamp,
Paternalism, supra note 38, at 1916 ("A justification based on consent may do more to obscure than to
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makes the agent's intervention non-paternalistic only if the subject's
consent is the primary factor that motivates the agent to intervene.
20 6
If the agent was going to intervene anyway, regardless of the
subject's consent, the fact that the agent and subject happen to agree
(that the agent should intervene) does not make the agent's
intervention non-paternalistic.
Moreover, the paternalistic agent and the subject may agree that
the agent should intervene, but to be paternalistic, the agent and
subject must not agree on why the agent should intervene. The
agent's decision to limit the subject's liberty must be independent
from the subject's consent such that it is "motivationally
impotent."20 7 The subject might think the agent should intervene
because that is what she, the subject, wants. However, the truly
paternalistic agent does not care that the subject wants him to
intervene; it is not a relevant consideration. The agent intervenes for
his own, albeit benevolent, independent reasons. The paternalistic
agent intervenes because he thinks that he knows better than the
subject how the subject ought to behave in the circumstances of
liberty limitation.
a. Ascertaining the Agent's Motive: Reconstructed Intent
Because motive plays such an important role in defining liberty-
limiting principles, one ought to know how to ascertain it.
Unfortunately, epistemological difficulties (for example, how can we
know a legislature's intent) and thorny individuation problems (for
example, does the legislature want to ban smoking in order to protect
clarify the issues."); Chan, supra note 24, at 91 & n.17 (subsequent consent); Douglas N. Husak,
Paternalism and Autonomy, 10 PIn. & PUB. AFF. 27, 33 (1980) (same); Tziporah Kasachkoff,
Paternalism: Does Gratitude Make It Okay?, 20 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 1, 6-20 (1994); Ranbolt, supra
note 115, at 57 ("TIis view has little plausibility."); Soble, supra note 96, at 351; Cynthia A. Stark,
Hypothetical Consent and Justification, 97 J. PHIL. 313, 321 (2000) ("Only actual consent sanctions
coercion."); Weale, Paternalism, supra note 18, at 171-72 (subsequent consent); James Woodward,
Paternalism and Justification, in NEW ESSAYS IN ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (Kai Nelson & Steven C.
Patten eds.,), published as 8 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 67, 70-71 & n.5 (Supp. 1982).
206. Weale, Paternalism, supra note 18, at 171-72.
207. Clarke, supra note 112, at 88 ("A paternalist may believe that his target shares his view that the
intervention is for his own good. He remains a paternalist insofar as his reason for intervening is the
target's good rather than the target's desires."); Hershey, supra note 127, at 178-79.
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smokers themselves, in order to protect third parties, or in order to
protect both) plague efforts to determine motive.
20 8
Feinberg contended that the solution to both the epistemological
and individuation problems of ascertaining motive is to use a
"reconstructed intent" rather than attempting to ascertain the actual
psychological intent of the paternalistic agent.209 Feinberg urged that
we should look to "the implicit rationale of the law-the account of
its role, function, and motivation that most coheres with the known
facts. ' 210 In short, we must determine the "most plausible" intent of
the paternalistic agent and use that intent as the basis for establishing
whether the agent's liberty limitation is paternalistic.
2 11
b. Summary of Condition Three
The third condition of hard paternalism requires that the agent limit
the subject's liberty without regard for the subject's desires
contemporaneous with the liberty limitation. Were the agent to limit
the subject's liberty pursuant to the subject's desires, then the agent's
limitation would not be paternalistic.
208. HAYRY, MEDICAL CONTROL, supr note 72, at 23; see KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 17 n.10, 178,
Husak, Legal Paternalism, supra note 167.
209. FEINBERO, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 16 ("T"he reason that in fact supports [a law], may
not then be the reason that impelled a legislator to vote for it"); id at 17 ("Sometimes we can construct
an implicit rationale for the law . . . that . . . provides it with a plausibly coherent rational
reconstruction."); id. at 19 ("So it is useful to look for an 'implicit rationale'... ."); id. at 25 ("iThere
are many laws now on the books that seem to have hard paternalism as an essential part of their implicit
rationales, and that some of these at least, seem to most of us to be sensible and legitimate
restrictions."); FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 6, at xvii ("In favor of the principle is
the fact that there are many laws now on the books that seem to have hard paternalism as an essential
part of their implicit rationales .... ") (emphasis added); id at 220 (suggesting use of "the most
plausible rationale we can reconstruct"); id at 224 ("[']hem was a harm principle rationale... even
though, in many instances, it may not have been [the legislators'] rationale."); see also GUTMANN &
THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 253 ("If we probed officials and citizens... we would no doubt find many
different kinds of reasons .... But the dominant reasoning and the most cogentjustifications for the ban
rely on moralist categories.. . .") (emphasis added); KLEINIO, supra note 3, at 178; KULTOEN, supra
note 3, at 167; THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 171; Husak, Liberal Neutrality, supra note 27, at 60-61
("[T]he quest for the rationale of a law seems no less elusive than the quest for legislative intent....
[H]ow can anyone pretend to have identified the rationale of a law?... Liberals should struggle to
decide whether any plausible rationale for drug proscriptions can satisfy the neutrality constraint.")
(emphasis added); Weale, Invisible Hand, supra note 24, at 790 (discussing when one is justified in
"attributing" paternalistic intentions to policymakers).
210. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supranote 18, at21.
211. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 54246 (1993)
(analyzing whether municipal ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifice "targeted" religious conduct
protected by the First Amendment).
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4. Condition Four: The Agent Must Either Disregard Whether the
Subject Engages in the Restricted Conduct Substantially
Voluntarily or Deliberately Limit the Subject's Substantially
Voluntary Conduct
The fourth condition of hard paternalism requires that the agent
either (1) disregard whether the subject engages in the restricted
conduct substantially voluntarily or (2) deliberately limit the subject's
substantially voluntary conduct. This condition allows one to
distinguish hard paternalism from soft paternalism.
212
My specification of this condition is broader than that provided by
any other writer. Philosophers distinguish hard paternalism from soft
paternalism based on the idea that hard paternalism restricts
substantially voluntary conduct while soft paternalism restricts
conduct that is not substantially voluntary. 213  So, the standard
distinguishing feature of hard paternalism is the extent to which the
subject's conduct is substantially voluntary.
I contend that this condition, like the other three conditions, should
be agent-focused. The important consideration is not whether the
subject, in fact, acts substantially voluntarily. Rather, what matters
for purposes of the definition of hard paternalism is whether the agent
knows or cares that the subject acts substantially voluntarily. First,
however, I will explicate the concept of substantial voluntariness.
a. The Threshold Concept: "Substantial Voluntariness"
At the outset of Harm to Self, Feinberg explained that hard
paternalism is a principle by which the state limits the liberty of
212. See supra Part ll.
213. See, e.g., BAYLES, supra note 127, at 122; FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 12;
KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 8; Arneson, Paternalism, supra note 113, at 251 ("The hard paternalist
position holds that paternalism can be justifiable even if the individual action that is restricted is
substantially voluntarily chosen."); Beauchamp, Paternalism, supra note 38, at 1915 ("In strong
paternalism ... it is proper to protect or benefit a person by autonomy-limiting measures even if the
person's contrary choices are [substantially] autonomous."); Dworldn, Paternalism-ENCYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 44, at 941; Feinberg, Paternalism, supra note 45, at 390 ("Hard paternalism justifies the
forcible prevention of some... activities even when those activities are done in a fully voluntary (i.e.
free and informed) way."); Hayry, Paternalism, supra note 38, at 454 ("Those who advocate strong
paternalism ... control... behavior even if the decisions leading to these are not, in any detectable
sense, impaired.").
[Vol. 20:659
COUNTING THE DRAGON'S TEETH AND CLAWS
"competent adults, against their will, from the harmful consequences
even of their fully voluntary choices and undertakings." 214 Ten years
later, in his 1996 Encyclopedia of Philosophy chapter on paternalism,
Feinberg defined hard paternalism as the restriction of "fully" or
"wholly" voluntary self-regarding conduct.
215
Feinberg surely stated a stronger definition than necessary. Hard
paternalism need not endorse so extreme a position.216 First, little, if
any, human behavior is fully voluntary.217 Feinberg's definition is so
broad that it encompasses interference with conduct that does not
even exist.218 Second, hard paternalism can be made more modest so
that it is at least plausible as a liberty-limiting principle.219 If we want
to explore whether hard paternalism might, to some extent, be
justifiable, we will want a definition that does not predetermine a
negative answer.
It is surely too demanding to require that a subject's conduct be
completely free from all epistemic and volitional defects before
assessing that she has "consented" to her own conduct.220  So,
philosophers--and the law-require only that a subject be
214. FEINBEKG, HARM TO SELF, Supra note 18, at 12 (emphasis added); see id. at 15 ("ILlegal
paternalism' [is] that principle which legitimizes interfering with the fidly voluntary, self-regarding
choices of competent adult persons.") (emphasis added); FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 18, at
115-17. Later, Feinberg clarified that the relevant distinction is between "more or less fully voluntary
and not fully voluntary assumption of a risk." FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 104-05, 115,
117; id at 158 ("His act need not be close to the extreme of total involuntariness in order to be
'involuntary enough' to warrant interference."); id at 160. Still, Feinberg continued to use the concept
of full voluntariness. Id at 107, 112, 248,255,299,341; see also FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING,
supra note 6, at xvii, 180, 202. VanDeVeer noted this inconsistency and that it has the effect of making
soft paternalism "overly interventionist." VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 85. He then uses the same
definition himself later in his own book. Id at 339; see also DWORKIN, AuTONoMY, supra note 37, at
124.
215. Feinberg, Paternalism, supra note 45, at 390-91. Oddly, Arneson criticized Feinberg on this
imprecision long before the publication of Harm to Self in 1986. See Ameson, Mill Versus, supra note
41, at 482-84 (arguing that even substantial voluntariness is too high a standard); KULTGEN, supra note
3, at 228.
216. Arneson, Mill Versus, supra note 41, at 482-84.
217. The evidence on this point is the subject of increasing scholarly interest. See generally Daniel
Kahneman, Maps of Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449
(2003) (Nobel Prize lecture); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics
and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Gregory Mitchell, Taking
Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1907 (2002); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for
Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1165 (2003).
218. Arneson, Mill Versus, supra note 4 1, at 484.
219. ld. at482.
220. Id at 482-84.
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substantially free to at least a "substantial degree." 221 Employing this
threshold permits philosophers to economically refer to classes of
cases where distinct moral issues lie.
22 2
Threshold accounts are efficient. However, it is important to not
confuse the terms used to describe threshold concepts with those used
to describe the "background variables" that go into determining
whether the threshold concept applies. 223  Unfortunately, some
commentators often confuse these two sorts of terms.224
Nevertheless, one can avoid the confusion by remembering that the
voluntariness of a subject's conduct is a linear function of her
221. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 123 ("For an action to be autonomous we
should only require a substantial degree of understanding and freedom from constraint...."); id at 157
("[Al substantial grasp of central facts and other descriptions is generally sufficient"); id. at 166 ("[W]e
need only establish general criteria for the point at which autonomous choice is imperiled, while
recognizing that no sharp boundary can be drawn in many cases ...."); id. at 266 (stating that although
it is difficult to specify "significant," the implication is clear); BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3,
at 59, 89, 181; FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 56 ("There will be a twilight area of cases
that are difficult to classify, but that is true of many other workable distinctions, including that between
night and day."); id at 309; Beauchamp, Paternalism, supra note 38, at 1916 ("These choices [restricted
by hard paternalism] may not be fully autonomous or voluntary, but in order to qualify as strong
paternalism, the choices of the beneficiary of paternalistic intervention must be substantially
autonomous or voluntary."); James Woodward, Paternalism and Justification, 7 CAN. J. PHIL. SUPPL.
67, 73 (1982); Michael Wreen, The Definition of Suicide, 14 Soc. THEORY & PRACTICE 1, 8 (1988)
("The distinction here [between a strong and a weak sense of'want"] is admittedly imprecise, but so are
many well-founded and serviceable distinctions, such as the red/orange distinction, the tall man/not so
tall man distinction, and so forth."). The subject's actual restricted conduct might not be substantially
voluntary, but the subject may have made a separate substantially voluntary choice (a meta choice) to
face the consequences of that epistemically or volitionally impaired conduct. See FEINBERG, HARM TO
SELF, supra note 18, at 160-61, 278, 310-12; Joan C. Callahan, Paternalism and Voluntariness, 16 CAN.
J. PHIL 199,218(1986).
222. See KLEMNIG, supra note 3, at 10.
223. See Steven Lee, A Puzzle of Sovereignty, 27 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 241,24546 (1997).
224. For example, in clinical medicine, the concept of "competence" refers both to a status and to a
particular factual state, more properly referred to as "capacity." See, e.g., FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra
note 110, at 36 ("Competence can be either a factual or a presumptive, categorical determination."); id
at 289-90 (describing competence as a continuum concept for which a threshold must be set for it to
serve as an "informed consent" gatekeeper); FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 319; ALAN
MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 114 (2d ed., 2003) (distinguishing capacity as factual status and competence
as legal status); ALBERT R. JONSEN ET AL., CLINICAL ETHICs 56-57 (1982) (recommending
"competence" to describe the value-laden legal status and "mental capacity" to describe a clinical
description); Elyn R. Saks & Stephen H. Behnke, Competency to Decide on Treatment and Research:
MacArthur and Beyond, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 103, 115 (1999) (distinguishing capacity and
competence); Smiley, supra note 109, at 300 ("[Ail individuals are mentally impaired to some extent..
. [and] it is necessary to locate the point.... ."); Robert M. Wettstein, Competence, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BioEThics 447, 447 (Warren T. Reich ed., 1995) ("[Ciompetence determinations are not essentially
factual, objective, or empirical matters but are value-laden judgments about the relative importance of
autonomy .... Competence is typically inferred from the person's behavior rather than observed
directly. ); Id at 446 (using "legal competence" and "clinical competence"); Winick, supra note 18,
at 41, 61.
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epistemic and volitional powers.225 Like the classic sorites problems,
voluntariness is a vague predicate with a smooth continuum.226 Only
when the voluntariness of a subject's conduct reaches a certain
threshold is the subject's conduct said to be substantially
voluntary.227
b. The Standard Distinguishing Feature of Hard Paternalism
Most researchers typically formulate the condition that
distinguishes hard paternalism from soft paternalism as whether the
subject's conduct is substantially voluntary.228 On this account, the
subject's lack of substantial voluntariness negates the value of
autonomy with regard to that conduct.229 Under these circumstances,
225. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 110, at 239-40.
226. See BEAUCHAMP & CHiLDRESS, supra note 3, at 123.
227. Just as the term "minor" applies categorically to persons under the age of 18, "substantial
voluntariness" applies in an all or nothing fashion when certain conditions are satisfied. Just as the age
of either a minor or non-minor can vary, so can the voluntariness of either substantially voluntary or
non-substantially voluntary conduct. See KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 75; see also ARMSDEN, supra note
27, at 142; BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 181; FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 110, at
239, 300; KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 94-95, 200 (defending relativistic conceptions instead of threshold
ones); Brock, Limited Paternalism, supra note 19, at 86-87. It is important to remember that the
voluntariness of a subject's conduct can vary significantly without crossing the threshold. Coercion, for
example, makes conduct not substantially voluntary. Extra forceful coercion, therefore, is surfeit; the
subject's conduct is already below the threshold. Similarly, extra understanding becomes "unused
surplus." See Rainbolt, supra note 115, at 47; Daniel Wikler, Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded, 8
PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 377, 384 (1979); see also BEAUCHAMP & CHLDRESS, supra note 3, at 123 ("Actions
therefore can be autonomous by degrees[;] a broad continuum exists."); FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF,
supra note 18, at 115-16; Id at 278 ("[Hs less-than-fully-voluntary consent will be 'voluntary enough'
for a valid and irrevocable contract); id. ("It is hard paternalism when circumstances satisfy A, B, C,
and D. The conditions in E represent properties that can range within hard paternalism."); RUSSELL
HARDIN, MORALITY WrrHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON 139-40 (1988) (noting that the strength of
paternalism falls on a continuum); KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 157; KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 90;
SCHONSHECK, supra note 28, at 18 1-82; Robert E. Goodin, Democracy, Preferences and Paternalism,
26 POL'Y Sci. 229, 236 (1993) ("Epistemic or volitional failings are points [on] a continuum. Any given
individual may display any of [those] failings to a greater or lesser extent.").
228. Some philosophers use the term "competence" in the same way that Feinberg used "voluntary
enough" and Beauchamp used "substantially autonomous." See Pope, A Response, supra note 11.
229. See BLOLAND, supra note 47, at 171 (explaining that Mill would approve of restricting
substantially nonvoluntary choices because they are "just as alien to the individual as someone else's
choices"); FEINBERO, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 12 ('[S]oft paternalism would permit us to
protect him from 'nonvoluntary choices,' which, being the genuine choices of no one at all, are no less
foreign to him."); id. at 28; FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 6, at xviii (arguing that
soft paternalism protects subjects "from dangerous choices that are not truly his own"); HUSAX, DRUGS
AND RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 130 ("[A]n agent's apparent choice is not truly his if it is nonvoluntary,
so interference with it would not violate his autonomy."); NIKKU, supra note 3, at 126-27; Feinberg,
Paternalism, supra note 45, at 391-92 ("To restrict his liberties in such circumstances.. we will not be
interfering with his real self or blocking his real will .... ."); Husak, Liberal Neutrality, supra note 27, at
62 ("Since nonautonomous choices lack value, the state has no reason to allow persons to make such
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soft paternalism legitimizes intervention with the subject's
conduct.230 Only when the subject acts with substantial autonomy is
intervention with her conduct for her own good characterized as hard
paternalism. Deciding whether any particular case satisfies this
condition requires an inquiry into whether the subject "consents" to
her own conduct. This inquiry consists of three sub-conditions.
First, the subject must be a rational agent capable of making
choices (that is, she must be autarchic).23' Nonautarchic individuals
cannot act with substantial voluntariness.232 Thus, restriction of their
conduct (for self-regarding reasons) is necessarily soft paternalism.
Newborn infants, lunatics, and those in a persistent vegetative state
are not capable of making decisions. Autarchic individuals, on the
other hand, might make foolish, unwise, reckless, and positively
perverse decisions, but they are at least capable of making such
23decisions. 23 As Feinberg noted, "There is a kind of minimal
compliment in being called 'foolish.' ' 234  Only the conduct of
autarchic individuals can be substantially voluntary.235 Only the
choices."); PATRICIA ILLINGWORTH, AIDS AND THE GOOD SOCIETY 67 (1990); Jergensen, supra note 47,
at 40 ("[Ain individual ought only to have her decisions respected if the decision reflects autonomous
self-expression."); id ("The possibility ofjustifiable paternalism has made a particular type of argument
plausible to some proponents of the modem principle of respect for autonomy. This idea is to regard
some types of paternalistic intervention as instances of weak paternalism. On this view, certain
interventions are legitimate because they are aimed at nonautonomous 'persons' who do harm to
'themselves.'"); Kasachkoft supra note 24, at 413 ("Paternalistic restrictions in these cases--sometimes
called cases of 'soft' or 'weak' paternalism-can be countenanced by a liberal society because they do
not deprive the individual of any autonomous choice that he or she is in fact capable of making.");
Jefflie G. Murphy, Incompetence and Paternalism, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 165 (1979)
(using the term "competent"); Thompson, supra note 47, at 245 ("If a paternalistic intervention restricts
only decisions that are already unfree ... the paternalism can be consistent with the principle of
liberty.").
230. See, e.g., BAYLES, supra note 127, at 122,125; BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 277;
Beauchamp & McCullough, supra note 51, at 90-91; DWORKIN, AUTONOMY, supra note 37, at 124;
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 125-26, 157; GERT ET AL., supra note 79, at 205-09;
KLEINIG, supra note 3, at 8-10, 14; TEN, supra note 110, at 110-11; VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 81-
87; Beauchamp, Medical Paternalim, supra note 51, at 140; Shapiro, supra note 4, at 528.
231. See S.I. Bnn, Freedom, Autonomy, and the Concept of a Person, 76 PRoC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC.
109 (1975-76); see also FFNBERG, HARM TO SELF, sWqra note 18, at 317-18; KULTGEN, supra note 3, at
91-93; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, s ra note 18, at 57.
232. See FADEN & BEAUCIWAP, supra note 110, at 235.
233. See NiKKU, supra note 3, at 171; see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 121-23;
Beauchamp & McCullough, supra note 51, at 91; FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 110, at 235-37;
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 146; Bruce Miller, Autonomy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIOETICS 215, 215 (Warren T. Reich ed., 1995); Wettstein, supra note 224, at 447.
234. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 1, at 380 n.8; see also id. at 30; BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 93-98; HAYRY, MEDICAL PATERNALISM, supra note 27, at 58-59.
235. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 110, at 235,249.
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restriction of their conduct, and indeed only a subset of it, can be hard
paternalism.
236
Second, to act substantially voluntarily, the subject must act
substantially free from controlling influences such as coetcion,
duress, or manipulation. The nature of such influences and substantial
freedom from them is thoroughly examined in Faden and
Beauchamp's A History and Theory of Informed Consent and in
Feinberg's Harm to Self, and I do not develop their analysis here.
237
Third, to act substantially voluntarily, the subject must act
substantially free from epistemic defects such as ignorance of the
nature of her conduct or its foreseeable consequences. 238 The nature
of substantial understanding is also thoroughly examined in
Feinberg's Harm to Self and in Faden and Beauchamp's A History
and Theory of Informed Consent, and I do not develop their analysis
here.239
The standard condition that philosophers offer to distinguish hard
paternalism from soft. paternalism (assuming the other three
definitional conditions are satisfied) is: "If the subject's conduct is
substantially voluntary, then liberty limitation with respect to such
conduct is hard paternalism." Conversely, "if the subject's conduct is
not substantially voluntary, then liberty limitation with respect to
such conduct is soft paternalism."
236. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 131.
237. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 110, at 238-41, 259; FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note
18, at 28-31, 316-43; see also BEAUCHAMP, ETHICS, supra note 22, at 351-52; BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 133; PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 21, at 951-53;
SCHONSHECK, supra note 28, at 151; VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 15.
238. Some authors have identified further personal properties of the subject, such as nonage and brain
damage. See FEINBERo, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 316; Soble, supra note 96, at 345. However,
these are derivative of the other categories, being just specific instances of cognitive or volitional
defects. See BEAUCHAMP & CIuLDRESs, supra note 3, at 136 ("[C]ompetence is a threshold and not a
continuum concept like autonomy."). This distinguishing feature between soft and hard paternalism has
led at least some writers to sort paternalism into the roughly analogous categories, fact-paternalism and
value-paternalism. See Simon N. Whitney et al., Morally Distinct Types of Paternalism: Fact- Versus
Value-Based, and Means- Versus End-Directed, unpublished manuscript, presented at the 13 1st Annual
Meeting of the American Public Health Law Association, Nov. 18,2003.
239. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 110, at 298-336; FEINBERO, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at
269-315; see also BEAUCHAMP & CHmLDRESS, supra note 3, at 88-93.
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c. A Revised Distinguishing Feature of Hard Paternalism
I contend that the standard condition distinguishing hard
paternalism from soft paternalism is too narrowly formulated.
Whether the subject's restricted conduct happens to be substantially
voluntary is not sufficient to distinguish hard paternalism from soft
paternalism. Hard paternalism is a liberty-limiting principle, a
purported justification of the agent's presumptively wrongful
conduct.240 Hard paternalism, like all liberty-limiting principles, is
distinguished by the reason the agent limits the subject's liberty.24'
Accordingly, one must define it in terms of the agent's perspective.
242
Soft paternalism, for example, does not authorize liberty limitation
simply because the subject acts (that is, happens to act as a matter of
fact) without substantial voluntariness. 243  As Kleinig explained,
"Weak paternalistic impositions are not justified merely because their
beneficiaries lack autarchy. As Mill makes clear, such impositions
must be directed to the 'improvement' of those on whom they are laid
... . In other words, the end of weak paternalism must be
autarchy."
' 244
240. See supra Part III.
241. See supra Part I.B.2.
242. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., ARMSDEN, supra note 27, at 93; GERT Er AL., supra note 79, at 226 (arguing that
"[]ust because people are not competent to make a rational decision does not mean that it is justified to
violate any moral rule with regard to them"); HAYRY, MEDICAL PATERNALISM, supra note 27, at 70;
KLEIG, supra note 3, at 141 ("The fact that a paternalistic imposition is weak does not mean that it is
therefore morally unproblematic."); KULTGEN supra note 3, at 8 ("This solicitude is constructive,"); id
at 20; d at 53 ("The kinds and extent of control which they legitimately exert, however, are strictly
limited by the ultimate objective--to prepare their children for autonomy ...."); id. at 54, 59, 78;
LocqE, supra note 3, at 57; VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 354-55 (arguing that the mere presence of
some lack of voluntariness does not imply a forfeiture of ascriptive autonomy); Michael D. Bayles,
Harm, In PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION; THE USES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 95, 115 (Michael D. Bayles
ed., 1978) (noting that the agent's motive for interfering must be to counteract the subject's lack of
understanding); Berger, supra note 85, at 47; Callahan, supra note 85, at 286; Childress & Campbell,
supra note 27, at 125 (denying that soft paternalism automatically justified intervention and requiring
that soft paternalism (1) employ the least restrictive means, (2) prevent serious harm, and (3) be
proportional to its negative effects); Douglas, supra note 85, at 174-75 (contrasting "cooperative
paternalism" in which the agent helps the subject become more competent and "conflictful paternalism"
in which the agent does not have that aim); Hospers, supra note 45, at 256 (arguing that the agent must
not impose his values onto the subject--even when the subject acts without substantial voluntariness;
under such circumstances, the agent must act to help the subject); Jergensen, supra note 47, at 48;
Lavin, supra note 85, at 2423.
244. KLEiNIO, supra note 3, at 31,214.
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Instead, to qualify as soft paternalism, the agent's motive for
liberty limitation must be either (1) to protect the subject from harm
or from failure to procure a benefit to which she did not consent to or
(2) to ensure or confirm that the subject really did consent to the
harm or failure.245 Soft paternalism does not justify intervention with
a subject's liberty simply because the subject happens to be acting
without substantial voluntariness. That would be post hoc
rationalization. A subject's lack of substantial voluntariness is not a
forfeiture of her right to autonomy.
The agent's motive matters. There must be a causal connection
between the subject's lack of substantial voluntariness and the
agent's intervention. In order to be soft paternalism, the agent must
intervene primarily because the subject acts without substantial
voluntariness. Consider Mill's bridge-crossing example. If the agent
were to stop the subject bridge crosser because the subject does not
cross substantially voluntarily, then that would be soft paternalism.
However, what if the agent knows the subject does not cross
substantially voluntarily but does not care, such that the subject's
status is motivationally impotent for the agent? Additionally, what if
the agent acts without regard to the subject's status-neither knowing
nor caring whether the subject crosses substantially voluntarily? The
agent's limitation of the subject's liberty under either of these other
two circumstances is hard paternalism no less than in circumstances
where the agent deliberately limits the liberty of a subject whose
conduct the agent knows to be substantially voluntary.
Before defending this expansion of hard paternalism's scope, it is
useful to lay out the four ways in which the agent's motive correlates
to the subject's conduct:
245. Cf. Hanis, Paternalism, supra note 87, st 91.
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Subject's Conduct
Substantially Not Substantially
.... _ Voluntary (SV) Voluntary (non-SV)
(1) Deliberately limit (2) Deliberately limit
SV (Hard) non-SV (Soft)
Agent's Motive
(3) Disregard whether (4) Disregard whether
SV (Hard) non-SV (Hard)
Cell (1) illustrates the classic distinguishing feature of hard
paternalism. 246  The agent deliberately limits the subject's
substantially voluntary conduct.247 Cell (2) illustrates the classic
distinguishing feature of soft paternalism. 248 The agent deliberately
limits the subject's non-substantially voluntary conduct.249 What
about Cells (3) and (4)? Here, the agent either fails to determine one
way or the other whether the subject's conduct is substantially
voluntary or simply does not care whether it is substantially
voluntary. In Cell (3), the subject's conduct actually is substantially
voluntary-as in Cell (1). The agent is prepared to limit the subject's
substantially voluntary conduct. Therefore, Cell (3) should be treated
like Cell (1), as a case of hard paternalism.
250
Perhaps more controversial is the argument for treating Cell (4)
like Cell (1). Here, the subject's conduct is not substantially
voluntary. Nevertheless, the agent does not limit the subject's liberty
because the subject's conduct is not substantially voluntary. The
agent neither knows nor cares that the subject is in fact not autarchic,
not substantially free from controlling influences, or not substantially
free from epistemic defects.
The agent does not purport to protect the subject from a choice that
is not her own.251 Rather, the agent purports to protect the subject





251. Mill's contemporary, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that the power of a hard paternalistic agent
"would be like the authority of a parent [for example, soft] if like that authority, its object was to prepare
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from a choice that the agent judges to be bad. The agent's reason for
liberty limitation is the same in Cell (4) as it is in Cell (1). Therefore,
Cell (4), like Cell (1), should be treated as an instance of hard
paternalism.
d. Summary of Condition Four
The fourth condition of hard paternalism requires that the agent
limit the subject's liberty without regard to the desires of the subject
contemporaneous with the liberty limitation. This condition
distinguishes hard paternalism from soft paternalism.
5. Summary of the Four Conditions
An instance of liberty limitation is hard paternalism only if: (1) the
agent intentionally limits the subject's liberty, (2) the agent limits the
subject's liberty primarily out of benevolence toward the subject, (3)
the agent disregards the subject's contemporaneous preferences, and
(4) the agent either disregards whether the subject engages in the
restricted conduct substantially voluntarily or deliberately limits the
subject's substantially voluntary conduct.252 Each of these conditions
is necessary, and they are jointly sufficient to define "hard
paternalism."
IV. OBJECTIONS AND COUNTEREXAMPLES TO MY DEFINITION
I now consider two types of objections and counterexamples to my
definition of hard paternalism. First, I will consider whether my
definition is too narrow and whether each of the four conditions of
my definition is necessary. Second, I will consider whether my
definition is too broad and whether the four conditions of my
definition are jointly sufficient. As Kultgen explained, a definition of
paternalism should maintain "continuity with the popular uses of
them for manhood; but it seeks on the contrary to keep them in perpetual childhood." ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA vii (Harvey C. Mansfield & Debra Winthrop trans., 2000)
(1835).
252. See supra Part HI.B.l!4.
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'paternalism"' and "should be true to firmly established, widely
shared, critical intuitions that suggest the range of actions to be
evaluated according to similar considerations."
253
A. Objection One: The Definition Is Too Narrow: Some of the Four
Conditions Are Not Necessary
A definition of hard paternalism is too narrow when it fails to
include within the definition instances of liberty limitation typically
associated with hard paternalism. 254 If my four conditions are
necessary conditions, an instance of hard paternalism cannot exist
which does not satisfy my four conditions. So, if one can think of a
genuine instance of hard paternalism that does not satisfy one of my
four conditions, then that instance would serve as a counterexample
to my argument that such a condition is necessary.
The statutes, adopted in many states, requiring motorcyclists to
wear helmets represent a classic case of hard paternalism.255 Let us
test whether it satisfies all four of my conditions. First, the agent (the
state) intentionally limits the liberty of the subject (the motorcyclist)
because it imposes a legal duty on the subject to wear a helmet. The
coercive power of the state affects the way the cyclist rides. Second,
the agent's primary motive in restricting the subject's liberty is
benevolence toward the subject. Helmet laws aim to protect cyclists
from injury to themselves.256 Third, the agent's motive is independent
from the subject's contemporaneous preferences. Legislators did not
enact helmet laws at the behest of motorcyclists. Fourth, the agent
either disregards whether the subject acts substantially voluntarily or
deliberately limits the subject's substantially voluntary conduct.
Legislators did not enact helmet laws to protect cyclists from choices
253. KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 61; see also NIKKu, supra note 3, at 43; VANDEVEER, supra note 6.
at 23.
254. Cf GERT ET AL., supra note 79, at 196 C'mhe definition must include all of the clear cases, and
exclude behavior which is commonly not regarded as paternalistic."); BAGoINI & FoSL, supra note 94,
at 159-60; Tom L. Beauchamp & Arnold 1. Davidson, The Definition of Euthanasia, 4 J. MED. & PHIL.
294,308 (1979).
255. Pope, Smoking Regulations, supra note 7, at 435-38.
256. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, The Liberal Critique of the Harm Principle, 17 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS
3, 8 (1998); Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Validity of Traffic Regulations Requiring Motorcyclists to
Wear Protective Headgear, 32 A.L.R. 3d 1270, § 4 (1970 & Supp. 1998).
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that are not really their own.257 Indeed, as Feinberg observed, "It
seems unlikely that we can justify compulsory helmet legislation on
soft paternalistic grounds .... [T]he 'typical' motorcyclist ... is not
simply mistaken about the factual basis of the risks he takes."
258
I have already defended each of my four conditions as necessary in
the course of explicating each condition. I provided examples in the
course of my description and defense of each condition. Therefore,
rather than consider additional counterexamples to the necessity of
my conditions, I turn now to counter the objection that my four
conditions are not jointly sufficient.
B. Objection Two: The Definition Is Too Broad: The Four
Conditions Are Not Jointly Sufficient
A definition of hard paternalism is too broad when it includes
within the definition instances of liberty limitation not typically
associated with hard paternalism.259 If my four conditions are jointly
sufficient, then if all four conditions are satisfied, we must have an
instance of hard paternalism. If we can think of an instance in which
all four conditions are satisfied but we still do not have hard
paternalism, that instance would serve as a counterexample to the
argument that my four conditions are jointly sufficient.
1. Objection from Dworkin and VanDe Veer
One objection to the joint sufficiency of my four conditions comes
from Dworkin and VanDeVeer. Dworkin's definition of hard
paternalism is one of the most influential. In each formulation of his
definition from 1971 to 1992, Dworkin included a condition that the
agent act contrary to the subject's contemporaneous preferences. 2 °
VanDeVeer, who is himself an important figure in paternalism
literature, also required that the agent believe that his liberty
257. See, e.g., Purver, supra note 256.
258. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, supra note 18, at 136.
259. Cf. BAGOINI & FosL, supra note 94, at 159-60; Beauchamp & Davidson, supra note 254, at 304.
260. See, e.g., Dworkin, Patemalism-MORALiTY, supra note 6, at 112; Dworkin, Paternalism-
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 44, at 940.
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limitation "is contrary to [the subject's] operative preference,
intention, or disposition at the time" the agent limits the subject's
liberty.261 He wrote that "[a]n agent's commission . . . must be
contrary to a subject's operative preference, intention, or disposition
to count as paternalistic."
262
Dworkin and VanDeVeer's objection challenges the sufficiency of
my third condition. I require only that the agent act independently of
the subject's preferences. In contrast, Dworkin and VanDeVeer
require more specifically that the agent act contrary to the subject's
preferences.
But the Dworkin/VanDeVeer condition is too demanding. 263 The
agent might act in circumstances where the subject simply had no
preferences on the issue but nonetheless wished to not be limited.
Alternatively, the agent might act in circumstances where the
subject's preferences and the agent's preferences were actually in
harmony-though not causally related.
Perhaps the subject wanted the agent to intervene and even left a
written authorization for the agent's liberty limitation. Nevertheless,
the agent did not receive the authorization and was unaware of the
subject's preferences. The agent's limitation of the subject's liberty
(from the agent's perspective) is not different from the case where
there is no authorization at all. A thief who steals a necklace, which
unbeknownst to her, the owner was going to give to the thief as a gift
the next day, is still a thief. In each case, the agent fails to act
pursuant to the subject's consent and consequently fails to respect the
subject's right to control her own decisions. The agent acts
independently of the subject's preferences either because the subject
has none or because the agent ignores them or is unaware of them.
261. VANDEVEER, supra note 6, at 22 (emphasis added).
262. Id at 202. Beauchamp and Childress similarly required that the agent override the subject's
"known preferences." BEAUCHAMP & CILDRESS, supra note 3, at 178.
263. Dworkin later broadened his third condition to demand only that the agent "act contrary to (or is
indifferent to)" the subject's contemporaneous preferences. Dworkin, PaternaIsn--CAmnJDoE, supra
note 113, at 649. Dworkin did not explain the reason for this modification. Gert and Culver formulated
their analogous condition in the same fashion, requiring that the agent "not believe that his action has
[the subject's] past, present, or immediately forthcoming consent." GERT ET AL., supra note 79, at 201.
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Liberty limitation under either of these circumstances can be hard
paternalism.
264
2. Objection from Gert and Culver
A second objection to the joint sufficiency of my four conditions
comes from Gert and Culver. Gert and Culver have argued in a series
of publications over the past 25 years that liberty limitation cannot be
paternalism unless it implicates a moral rule. 265 In their most recent
formulation, Gert and Culver required that the agent "recognize (or
should recognize) that his action toward [the subject] is a kind of
action that needs moral justification."266 Gert and Culver described
this condition as a "key element" of paternalistic behavior. 267 So,
Gert and Culver's objection to my definition is that an act of liberty
limitation could satisfy all four of my conditions and still not be hard
paternalism because it does not satisfy their moral rule condition.
As a concrete counterexample to the sufficiency of my four
conditions, Gert and Culver would likely offer the following case: a
husband, knowing that his wife is suicidal, hides his sleeping pills.
The husband (agent) does not violate a moral rule. Therefore, Gert
and Culver would contend that his act is not an act of hard
paternalism. 268 Yet, on my four conditions, hiding the sleeping pills is
hard paternalism. Therefore, Gert and Culver would contend, because
all four of my conditions are satisfied but because this case is not a
case of hard paternalism, my four conditions are not sufficient to
define hard paternalism.
264. E.g., Clarke, supra note 112, at 85-86; KULTGEN, supra note 3, at 62-63; Hershey, supra note
127, at 178. Joan Callahan suggested that we employ the term "fraternalistic" to distinguish the situation
where the agent acts without the subject's expressed dissent Callahan, supra note 85, at 264.
265. See, e.g., GERT ET AL., supra note 79, at 198-203. Gert and Culver did not aim to define hard
paternalism, but they did intend for their necessary and sufficient conditions to apply to all forms of
paternalism.
266. d. at 196.
267. Id at 198.
268. Actually, Dworkin first offered this case as an argument against Gert and Culver's moral rule
condition. Dworkin, Second Thoughts, supra note 113, at 106. Gert and Culver simply stuck to their
definition and denied that this case was an instance of paternalism. GERT ET AL., supra note 79, at 202.
Of course, the suicidal nature of the wife suggests that, even if this is a case of paternalism, it is a case of
soft paternalism. However, we can set that concern aside for present purposes.
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There are several problems with Gert and Culver's argument. First,
it establishes only that my four conditions are not sufficient to define
hard paternalism as they define hard paternalism. Gert and Culver
would have resisted (rather implausibly) the intuitive judgment that
this pill-hiding case is a case of hard paternalism. Second, Gert and
Culver's definition is not value neutral. Conceptually, we ought not
build normative judgments into the definition of hard paternalism.
Often, the morally interesting cases of hard paternalism happen to
involve the violation of a moral rule. However, to craft such a
restrictive definition begs the tough and interesting normative
questions surrounding the justifiability of hard paternalism.
269
CONCLUSION
Legal writers put hard paternalism to important justificatory uses.
Yet, this usage can be fruitful only if hard paternalism is clearly
defined. In this Article, I have defended four logically necessary and
sufficient conditions that define "hard paternalism., 270 Use of the
hard paternalism concept, only where it satisfies this definition,
should introduce clarity and precision of argument to the discourse. It
should permit that discourse to more effectively address the classic
question of political philosophy and normative jurisprudence: Under
what conditions (if any) is hard paternalism justified?
269. Cf. Clarke, supra note 112, at 85.
270. See supra Part Ill.
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